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AVIATION GUEST LAWS: A MODERN ANACHRONISM
By A. LEE SANDERS*
Polonius: "What do you read, my lord?"
Hamlet: "Words, words, words."
Shakespeare, Hamlet,
Act II, Scene 2.
And so it is with aviation accident litigation involving guest laws. Six-
teen jurisdictions in the United States have enacted guest statutes that
apply to aviation tort claims.1 Each statute was patterned after the auto-
mobile guest statutes then in effect in each state? Georgia applies a similar
rule to automobile and aviation activity as part of her common-law. Such
rules of law reduce in varying degrees the standard of care owed by a
host to a guest in the aircraft.
I. INTRODUCTION
The overall impact of these reduced standards of care upon aviation
litigation is our present concern; but, before attempting to unravel the
intricacies of these rules of law, let's briefly examine the history of their
emergence. For present purposes, suffice it to say that a "guest" in an air-
craft is one who rides gratuitously and at the favor of the owner or
operator.'
The long judicial journey of the doctrine that one who performs a
gratuitous undertaking owes only a duty of slight care began in 1703
in England.4 There Chief Justice Lord Holt held that a gratuitous bailee
of a cask of brandy could not be held liable for his ordinary negligence
to the bailor. It took some time, but Lord Holt's view of the Roman civil
law' drifted across the Atlantic and in 1917 found fertile soil in the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. In Massaletti v. Fitzroy6 that
* B.A., Long Beach State College, 1963; J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, University of Cali-
fornia, 1966; Member of the State Bar of California.
1 Arkansas (1955), California (1933), Delaware (1949), Idaho (1965), Illinois (1949), Indiana
(1951), Michigan (1945), Nebraska (1959), Nevada (1953), New Mexico (1953), North Dakota
(1959), Ohio (1955), Oregon (1949), South Carolina (1930), South Dakota (1949) and Utah
(1953); see Appendix for text and citation of each statute.
'ARK. STAT. ANN. 5 75-913 (1947); CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17158 (West 1960); DELAWARE
CODE ANN. 5 6101 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-1401 (1949); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 95Y2,
§ 9-201 (Smith-Hurd 1961); IND. STAT., §§ 47-1021, 1022 (1964), MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 257.401
(1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39w740 (1966); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.180 (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 64-24-1, 64-24-2 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-15-01 to 39-15-03 (1959); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 45-15.02 (Page 1953); ORE. REV. STAT. 5 46-801 (1962); S.D. CODE §§ 32-34-1,
32-34-2 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. 55 41-9-1, 41-9-2 (1953).
aSee W. PROSSER, TORTS 191 (3d ed. 1964). A more detailed analysis follows.
4 Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (Ex. 1703).
'See ORE. L. REV. 216, 217 (1954).
6228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917).
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Court applied Lord Holt's ruling to a case brought by a gratuitous rider
in an automobile against the driver. He sought money damages from the
driver on the basis of the driver's ordinary negligence. The Court held
that since the ride was a gratuitous undertaking, the "guest" had to prove
a greater degree of negligence.! The Massachusetts Rule, as it came to be
known, failed to receive wide acceptance as an expression of Anglo-
American common-law. Georgia,' Virginia,9 and Washington"o adopted the
reduced standard of care toward automobile guests as their common-law.
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in the English speaking por-
tion of the Western Hemisphere refused to engraft such a rule on to their
common-law.'1 Thus, until 1927, the majority rule was that the driver
of a motor vehicle, and a fortiori, the pilot of an aircraft, owed a duty of
reasonable care to gratuitous riders. 2 In that year Connecticut became
the first American jurisdiction to enact a "Guest Statute."1 Although,
ironically, Connecticut repealed its automobile guest statute ten years later,4
the dye had been cast. From 1927 to the passage of the last automobile
guest statute in 1938, twenty-eight additional states adopted the minority
rule by legislative enactment." Twenty United States jurisdictions failed
to succumb and have no guest laws.1" There is virtually unanimous agree-
ment that the economic and political force behind this legislative onslaught
was the liability insurance industry."
Thus, there was laid the historical basis for the application of the doc-
7 See note 5 supra, at 219..
'Hall v. Slaton, 40 Ga. App. 288, 149 S.E. 306 (1929).
9 Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30, 160 S.E. 77 (1931).
"
5 Blood v. Austin, 149 Wash. 41, 270 P. 103 (1928).
"See Joost, The Automobile Guest Rule, 2 PORTIA L.J. 105, 107-08 (1966), note 12 for cases
holding that the following jurisdictions refused to follow the Massachusetts Rule: Alaska, Con-
necticut, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Vermont
and Wisconsin; Black v. Goldweber, 172 Ark. 862, 291 S.W. 76 (1927); Munson v. Rupker, 148
N.E. 169 (Ind. App. 1925); McInnery v. McDougall, 47 Manitoba Rep. 119 (1937).
12 The majority rule was well stated in Avery v. Thompson, 117 Me. 120, 128, 103 A. 4, 7
(1918): " . . . we conceive the true rule to be that the gratuitous undertaker shall be mindful of
the life and limb of his guest and shall not unreasonably expose her to additional peril. This would
seem to be a sound, sane, and workable rule; one consistent with established legal principles and
just to both parties."
'"CoNN. GEN. REV. STAT. Ch. 308 (1927).
4 CONN. GEN. REv. STAT. Ch. 270, § 351(d) (1937).
"
5
Alabama (1935), Arkansas (1935), California (1929), Colorado (1931), Delaware (1935),
Florida (1937), Idaho (1931), Illinois (1935), Indiana (1929), Iowa (1927), Kansas (1931),
Kentucky (1930)-held constitutional, Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Kt. App. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347
(1932), Montana (1931), Nebraska (1931), Nevada (1933), New Mexico (1935), North Dakota
(1931), Ohio (1934), Oregon (1929), South Carolina (1930), South Dakota (1933), Texas
(1931), Utah (1935), Vermont (1929), Virginia (1938), Washington (1937), and Wyoming
(1931); for a criticism of this rejection of the majority rule, see Note, 10 U. CIN. L. REV. 289,
293-94 (1936).
1" Alaska, Arizona, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
17 See Burghardt v. Olson, 223 Ore. .15 5, 354 P.2d 871, 879 (1960); PRossER, supra, at 190-91;
2 M. MALCOLM, AUTOMOBILE GUEST LAW (1937); Comment, 19 BAYLOR L. REv. 75, 78 (1967);
Note, 17 Hastings L.J. 337 (1965); TIPTON, Florida's Automobile Guest Statute, 11 U. Fla. L.
Rev. 287, 288 (1958); Comment, 5 KAN. L. REv. 722, 723 (1957); Georgetta, The Major Issues
in a Guest Case, 1954 INs. L.J. 583 (1954); Comment, 26 CAL. L. REv. 251, 252 (1938); Weber,
Guest Statutes, 11 CIN. L. Rev. 24, 35 (1937); Cornish, The Automobile Guest, 14 Bos. U. L. REv.
728, 751 (1934); and Comment, The Liability of An Automobile Driver to a Non-Paying Passenger,
20 VA. L. REV. 326, 328 (1933).
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trine of a diminished standard of care towards gratuitous riders in aircraft.
Although in the 1930's, South Carolina and California enacted guest
statutes applicable to aircraft, the remaining fourteen statutes did not
come into being until after 1948.18 Georgia joined the ranks in 1952 when
the intermediate appellate court extended the Massachusetts Rule to
gratuitous riders in aircraft.19 Apparently Massachusetts has not firmly
committed herself to a similar rule. 0
There are eleven states with automobile guest statutes that do not apply
a similar rule to aircraft. 1  Of those, Florida, Kansas, Ohio' and
Virginia" have refused to accept the arguments made by the insurance
industry that "aircraft" should be equated with "motor vehicle" as used
in the automobile guests statutes. During the period of repeal of California's
aviation guest statute, from 1947 to 1949, the attorney general came to
the same conclusion."0 Hence, the majority rule appears to be that without
definitive legislation action, automobile guest statutes will not be applied
to aircraft."
The stated reasons and purposes for automobile and aviation guest
statutes have been somewhat consistent in this very inconsistent area of
tort law. There were two primary policy considerations underlying their
enactment:
1. The 'inherent feeling that it was unjust to permit the benefactor of
a person taking a free ride to be penalized by his guest passenger for an act of
kindness, hospitality or sociability for which the benefactor received no re-
ward or benefit whatever.'"'
2. Prevention of fraud and collusion between the driver and his guest so
as to obtain money from the driver's liability insurance carrier.'
1s See note 1, supra, and the Appendix.
" Sammons v. Webb, 86 Ga. App. 382, 71 S.E.2d 832 (1952).
'0Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., 278 Mass. 420, 180 N.E. 212 (1932); Rich v. Fin-
ley, 325 Mass. 99, 89 N.E.2d 213, 219 (1949); Walthew v. Davis, 201 Va. 557, 561-62, 111
S.E.2d 784 (1960); Hardman, Aviation Guest Statutes, 1962 INs. L.J. 561, 562, note 3.
21 Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington
and Wyoming. For an excellent, but brief summary of automobile guest law, see Morrison and Ar-
nold, Automobile Guest Law Today, 27 Ins. Counsel J. 223 (1960).
22 Gridley v. Cardenas, 3 Wis.2d 623, 627, 89 N.W.2d 286 (1958) (applying Florida law);
earlier the Florida Supreme Court had declined to consider the matter in Sieverts v. Loffer, 45
So.2d 483 (1950); Note, 10 Mercer L. Rev. 213, 215 (1958).
'Hayden v. Boyle, 174 Kan. 140, 145, 254 P.2d 813 (1953).
" Hanson v. Lewis, 26 Ohio Abs. 105, 1 Av. L. RE'. 730 (Com. P1. 1937).
'Not only did Virginia refuse to apply its automobile guest statute to aircraft, but it dis-
tinguished automobile travel from air travel and refused to apply its common-law rule of reduced
care. Walhhew v. Davis, supra note 20, at 561.
26 12 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 28, 29 (Cal. 1948).
"See Orr, Airplane Tort Law, 4 S.C. L.Q. 193, 206 (1951-52); 165 A.L.R. 916 (1946).
's Lowe, Suggestions for the Trial of Auto Damage Suits, 16 IND. L.J. 288, 289 (1940-41);
see also Sand v. Mahnan, 248 Cal. App. 2d 679, 683, 56 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1967); Jensen v. Mower,
4 Utah 2d 336, 294 P.2d 683 (1956); PROSSER, sura, at 191; Lasher, Hard Laws Make Bad Cases,
9 Santa Clara Lawyer 1, 15 (1968); Comment, Judicial Nullification of Guest Statutes, 41 S.
CAL. L. REv. 884, 885 (1968); Comment, 54 N.W. U. L. Rev. 263, 265 (1959); Note, 1 Wyo.
L. REv. 182, 183 (1947); Comment, 18 CAL. L. REv. 184 (1930): ". . . there is a very prevalent
feeling that such suits should be discouraged, inasmuch as they are unsportsmanlike and an abuse
of hospitality ....
'9 Ward v. George, 112 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Ark., 1937); Kitchens v. Duffield, 79 N.E.2d 906
(Ohio, 1948); Schlim v. Gau, 80 S.D. 403, 125 N.W.2d 174, 177 (1963); Joost, supra at 111,
see note 11; Appleman, Wilful and Wanton Conduct in Automobile Guest Cases, 13 IND. L.J. 131,
135 (1937); Note, 8 WuSTERN Rua. L. REv. 170, 172 (1957); Note, 4 U. FLA. L. REV. 79 (1951);
Note, 33 MicH. L. REV. 804, 805 (1937).
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The former consideration was based on an economic by-product of the
depression; to wit, the hitch-hiker.' With economic panic, unemploy-
ment and extensive job hunting, there was a tremendous increase in
people seeking free rides; hence, the flourish of automobile guest statutes
desirable economic force ever afflict aviation.
Much has been written about the second major reason for guest statutes,
but the casualty insurance industry has presented no data showing the
number of "collusive" suits filed and adverse jury verdicts returned.
Two secondary reasons advanced for the enactment or continued exis-
tence of guest statutes can be gleaned from the cases and the writers:
1. Loss payouts to guests increased insurance rates and premiums;" and
2. So many lawsuits were being filed by guests that they hampered the
judicial administration of justice."5
Again, there has been very little data presented upon which one could
judge the validity in a positive manner of either of these propositions."
So much for the history and rationale of guest statutes in general. Let
us now turn to the specific problems the aviation guests statutes or laws
create for the litigation processes.
At the outset it should be noted that in terms of legal history we have
had relatively little time within which to develop sufficient decisional in-
terpretation of the specific aviation guest laws. However, since the various
aviation statutes were directly patterned after their automobile counter-
parts, courts and writers have looked to judicial interpretations of the
comparable statutory language in the automobile statutes." The general
issues raised by guest laws in aircraft accident litigation are not radically
different than those the bench and bar have faced for years in automobile
accident litigation; i.e., who is a "guest?", and, if the plaintiff was a
"guest," what showing will suffice to constitute the appropriate degree of
aggravated culpability? Further, since certain of the later aviation guest
statutes were patterned after earlier aviation or automobile statutes, it is
not uncommon for the courts to look to other jurisdictions for decisional
assistance." Finally, before launching into a more particularized discus-
sion, it is important to bear in mind two general rules of interpretation and
construction of these statutes:
1. Since guest statutes are in open derogation of the common-law, they
must be construed strictly, so that every benefit of the doubt should be
weighed in favor of non-applicability;' and,
0 PROSSER, supra at 191, note 83.
31Note, I Wyo. L.J. 182, 183 (1947).
132 Malcolm, supra at 2; see Appleman, note 29; De Lacy, Trials Under the Guest Statute, 15
NEB. L. BULL. 306, 307 (1936).
" These expressed reasons in support of guest statutes will be discussed in greater detail in the
concluding section of this article.
"I Halbert v. Berlinger, 127 Cal. App. 2d 6, 18-19, 273 P.2d 274 (1954); Whittemore v. Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp., 51 Cal. App. 2d 605, 609, 125 P.2d 531 (1942); Note, 16 S. CAL. L. REv.
358, 359 (1943).
'Smith v. Meadows, 56 N.M. 242, 242 P.2d 1006 (1952); Fulghum v. Bleakley, 177 S.C.
286, 181 S.E. 30 (1935); Melby v. Anderson, 64 S.D. 249, 266 N.W. 135 (1936).
"This is clearly the majority rule in the United States. See Whittecar v. Cheatham, 226 Ark.
31, 287 S.W.2d 578, 579 (1956); Morrison v. Townley, 269 Cal. App. 2d 863, 75 Cal. Rptr.
[Vol. 36
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2. Each case is sui generis on its facts.3 7
In summary, our interest here is to explore the impact upon aviation
litigation of the aviation guest laws of Arkansas, California, Delaware,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
and Utah.
The threshold question in any such inquiry is whether these laws, either
statutory or decisional, are constitutionally valid exercises of state police
power.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AVIATION GUEST LAWS
The constitutionality of aviation guest laws has not been directly de-
termined by an appellate court as of this writing. However, there has been
extensive litigation regarding the various aspects of the constitutionality of
their statutory companions, the automobile guest laws."
The early assaults were predicated upon either or both of two grounds:
1. The guest statutes violated certain state constitutional provisions that
protected the right of the individual to have a remedy for wrongfully in-
flicted injury,"' to have speedy access to the courts' and to have no limitations
on recoveries for wrongful death;" and
2. The classification "guest" was arbitrary and unreasonable, and was thus
in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.'
274 (1969); Mumford v. Robinson, 231 A.2d 477, 479 (Del. 1967); Summers v. Summers, 40
Ill. 2d 338, 239 N.E.2d 795 (1968); Baldwin v. Hill, 315 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1963) (applying
Michigan law); Clinger v. Duncan, 166 Ohio St. 216, 141 N.E.2d 156 (1957); 2 HAR'ER &
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 961 (1956); Comment, 26 CAL. L. REV. 251, 252 (1938). The rule
in South Dakota has just been reversed. Statutes in derogation of the common-law are to be lib-
erally construed so as to give maximum effect to their intended purpose. S.D. CODE § 2-14-12
(1967); and Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941).
"
7 Anderson v. Lippes, 18 Mich. App. 281, 170 N.W.2d 908 (1969).
38See 111 A.L.R. 1011 (1937).
a'The following cases rejected plaintiff's argument and upheld the validity of the guest statutes
on this point: Forsman v. Colton, 136 Cal. App. 97, 28 P.2d 429 (1933); Vogts v. Guerrette,
142 Colo. 527, 351 P.2d 851 (1960); Clarke v. Storchak, 384 I11. 564, 52 N.E.2d 229 (1943);
Bailey v. Resner, 168 Kan. 439, 214 P.2d 323 (1950); Wright's Estate v. Pizel, 168 Kan. 493, 214
P.2d 328 (1950); Rogers v. Brown, 129 Neb. 9, 260 N.W. 794 (1935); Perozzi v. Ganiere, 149
Ore. 330, 40 P.2d 1009 (1935); Stewart v. Houk, 127 Ore. 589, 271 P. 998, 272 P. 893 (1928);
Elkins v. Foster, 101 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Campbell v. Paschall, 132 Tex. 226, 121
S.W.2d 593 (1938). See also De Lacy, Trials Under the Guest Statute, 15 NEB. L. BULL. 306
(1936). The Kentucky guest statute was held unconstitutional, however, in Ludwig v. Johnson,
243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932), in part on the ground that it violated § 14 of the Kentucky
Constitution, which preserved a remedy for injury wrongfully inflicted. See Weber, Guest Statutes,
11 U. CIN. L. REV. 24, 30-33 (1937).
40 The following cases rejected plaintiff's argument and held that the guest -statutes did not
deny them access to the courts: Roberson v. Roberson, 193 Ark. 9, 101 S.W.2d 961 (1937);
McMillan v. Nelson, 149 Fla. 334, 5 So.2d 867 (1942); Rector v. Hyer, 35 Ohio Abs 451,
41 N.E.2d 886. (1:941); Hillock v. Heilman, 201 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1967).
4Plaintiffs' argument was rejected in Smith v. Williams, 51 Ohio App. 464, 1 N.E.2d 643
(1935), where the court held that the guest statute did not deprive one of a remedy for wrongful
death. For parallel reasoning based on a partially different Constitutional provision, see Bowman v.
Puckett, 144 Tex. 125, 188 S.W.2d 571 (1945), and Paschall v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., 100
S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936). The Kentucky automobile guest statute, however, was held
unconstitutional in Ludwig v. Johnson, supra, in part on the ground that it violated § 241 of the
Kentucky Constitution, which created a cause of action for wrongful death.
'Plaintiffs' arguments have so far been constantly rejected. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117
(1929); Pickett v. Matthews, 238 Ala. 542, 192 So. 261 (1939); Harlow v. Ryland, 172 F.2d 784
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Heretofore, those courts that have faced these issues have, for the most
part, found the automobile guest statutes constitutionally sound.
In view of the often harsh and inhumane results caused by these statutes,
there is every reason to believe that plaintiffs will persist in their efforts
to reverse this trend of judicial opinion. Theories now advanced are mov-
ing away from the cold and sterile legalistic formulas of unreasonable
classification and lack of access to courtrooms. In California' and Colo-
rado" it has been strongly argued that one protected inalienable right of
man is the right to be free from wrongful injury or death at the hand of
another. Such a right is innate in man and cannot be tampered with by
government. Indeed, it is government's sacred duty to protect the indi-
vidual from wrongful harm. As of this writing, the appellate courts in
both jurisdictions have rejected the "Rights-of-Man" theory." However,
there were very strong dissents in the opinions of the Colorado Supreme
Court." In view of the current concern over protecting human rights when
they conflict with property rights, it is safe to say that the appellate courts
have not heard the end of the "Rights-of-Man" theory.
A recent California case provides another possible constitutional de-
fect in the various aviation guest laws in the United States. In Blevins v.
Sfetku,"7 Justice Hufstedler" of the District Court of Appeals held, for
the unanimous Court, that the California Motorboat Guest Statute was
unconstitutional. She reasoned that the reduced standard of care con-
doned by the guest statute conflicted with the higher standard of conduct
established by the federal Motorboat Act of 1940. Therefore, California
was precluded by the Supremacy Clause" of the United States Constitution
from enforcing the motorboat guest statute in a personal injury case arising
on the Colorado River between California and Arizona.
(6th Cir. 1949) (involving the Arkansas Statute); O'Donnall v. Mullaney, 66 Cal. 2d 994, 429
P.2d 160 (1967); Stephen v. Proctor, 235 Cal. App. 2d 228, 45 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1965); Ferreira
v. Barham, 230 Cal. App. 2d 128, 40 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1964); Romero v. Tilton, 78 N.M. 696,
437 P.2d 157 (1967); Gallegher v. Davis, 37 Del. 380, 183 A. 620 (1936); Smith v. Williams,
supra note 41; Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615, 186 Wash. 700, 59 P.2d 1183 (1936).
For a critical analysis of the precedential strength of the Silver case, see Lascher, Hard Laws Make
Bad Cases, 9 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 1, 5 (1968). The Silver case was cited with approval in Sorrell
v. White, 103 Vt. 277, 153 A. 359 (1931), but the court did not expressly rule on the constitu-
tionality of the Vermont automobile guest statute. Similarly, it has been held not in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment for a state legislature to distinguish between an owner-rider who gives
compensation to the driver and a nonowner-rider who does likewise. Patton v. La Bree, 60 Cal. 2d
606, 387 P.2d 398 (1963), with a strong dissent by Justice Raymond Peters. This issue was argued,
but not decided in Ludwig v. Johnson, supra note 39.
'Ferreira v. Barham, 230 Cal. App. 2d 128, 129, 135, 40 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1964).
"Taylor v. Welle, 143 Colo. 37, 352 P.2d 106 (1960); Vogts v. Guerrette, 142 Colo. 527,
351 P.2d 851 (1960); Coffman v. Godsoe, 142 Colo. 575, 351 P.2d 808 (1960); Noakes v. Gaiser,
136 Colo. 73, 315 P.2d 183 (1957).
'Ferreira, supra at Cal. App. 2d 135; Vogts, supra at P.2d 862.
"Vogts, supra at P.2d 863: "This opinion is more than just a dissent-it is a warning and the
sounding of an alarm. In the ultimate the stakes in this case are high: the rights of man as an
individual and person are under fire. . . . if the opinion shall be that the Guest Statute is valid,
it shall be accepted for what it is: a derogation of the 'natural, essential and inalienable' rights
of man which we as judges are sworn to protect and enforce."
47 259 Cal. App. 2d 527, 66 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1968).
" Subsequent to the Blevins opinion,,, Justice Hufsteder was nominated and confirmed to the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and was sworn in on October 1,
1968.
49 Art. VI, Cl. 2.
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The Blevins case provides an excellent analogy to the situation in avia-
tion accident litigation. All aviation guest laws reduce the standard of
care or conduct owed by an airman to his "guest." Those standards vary
from "gross negligence" in Georgia, Idaho, Michigan, Nevada, North
Dakota and Oregon at one end of the spectrum to "wilful misconduct"
in California, Illinois, Indiana, Nevada, Ohio, South Dakota and Utah
at the other. These standards would compare with the "wilful misconduct"
duty of the California Motorboat Guest Statute." In conflict with this
standard of conduct is that created by Federal Aviation Regulation § 91.9:
No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to
endanger the life or property of another."'
There can be no doubt that such regulations have the full force and effect
of federal law within the meaning of the term "laws" in the Supremacy
Clause." To this writer's knowledge no appellate court has ruled on this
issue as of this writing."
Before turning to a particularized analysis of the provisions of these
aviation guest statutes, we must consider the problem of choice of the
applicable law in accidents having multi-state contacts.
111. CHOICE OF LAW
In light of the tremendous territorial mobility of aircraft today, it is
very common for each aviation accident to have many contacts with
several jurisdictions. Consequently, the bench and bar are usually faced
with serious and complex choice of law problems in such litigation.' It is
not the intended purpose here to explore the totality of choice of law
problems in aviation accident litigation, but rather, to restrict the inquiry
to the applicable rules in regard to cases involving aviation guest laws.
The general common-law rule was that the forum had to apply the
substantive law of the jurisdiction wherein the tort occurred; i.e. lex loci
delicti. The choice of law analysis under that rule was quick and easy, if
not always just and rational. For all practical matters, the law of the spot
where the aircraft impacted with the earth would be applied. If that law
provided a diminished standard of care as to a "guest," then it would be
applied, because such laws are "substantive" for the purpose of conflict of
laws characterization.' And so it was until the 1960's.' Of those sixteen
states where there is no question that the guest law applies to aviation,
50 CAL. HARB. & NAy. CODE § 661.1 (West 1966).
5t28 Fed. Reg. 6704 (June 29, 1963).
"See Stanley v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 973, 975 (N.D. Ohio 1965); Lange v. Nelson-
Ryan Flight Service, Inc., 259 Minn. 460, 108 N.W.2d 428 (1961).
5The issue is presently pending before the First District of the California District Court of
Appeals in Mittelman v. Seifert (1st D. Cal., filed -).
14See Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968); Hopkins v. Lockheed Air-
craft Corp., 394 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1968); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203
A.2d 796 (1964); and Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172
N.E.2d 526 (1961).
" Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594, 595 (Del. 1965).
"eSee Schnake and Murad, Conflict of Laws, 16 HAsITONGs L.J. 42, 45 (1964); Ehrenzweig,
Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE L.J. 595, 600-01 (1959); Choice of Law in Ap-
plication of Automobile Guest Statutes, 95 A.L.R.2d 12 (1964).
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at least ten still adhere to lex loci delicti: Arkansas,"7 Delaware," Georgia,"9
Idaho,"5 Michigan," Nebraska, " Nevada,"s South Carolina," South Dakota,"
and Utah."
The resolution in the field of conflicts of law has affected guest law
litigation. No longer can we say with any assurance that the substantive
law of the situs of the accident will apply. At least five jurisdictions with
aviation guest laws have adopted the new rule: California, "7 Indiana,"
North Dakota," Ohio,"' and Oregon.7'
Whether Illinois has adopted the modern rule is somewhat problematical.
At the very least it can be said that its court have rejected the simplistic
lex loci analysis and will apply Illinois law to a foreign accident on issues
related to interspousal immunity, application of the Illinois Dram Shop
Act and wrongful death damages."'
"'McGinty v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966).
"sFolk v. York-Shipley, Inc., 239 A.2d 236 (Del. 1968).
'Hamby v. Hamby, 103 Ga. App. 826, 121 S.E.2d 169 (1961).
"
6 George v. Stanfield, 33 F. Supp. 486 (N.D. D. 1940).
61Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969).
6 5Yanney v. Nemer, 154 Neb. 188, 47 N.W.2d 368 (1951).
6" Campbell v. Baskin, 69 Nev. 108, 242 P.2d 290 (1952).
"4Griffin v. Planters Chemical Corp., 302 F. Supp. 937 (D. S.C. 1969); Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244
S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964).
65McMahon v. De Kraay, 70 S.D. 180, 16 N.W.2d 308 (1944).
6 Wood v. Taylor, 8 Utah 2d 210, 332 P.2d 215 (1958).
67 Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727 (1967).
6 Witherspoon v. Salm, 237 N.E.2d 116 (Ind. App. 1968).
69 Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v. U.S., 272 F. Supp. 409 (D. N.D. 1967).
7 Thigpen v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 229 N.E.2d 107 (Ohio App. 1967).
71 DeFoor v. Lematta, 249 Ore. 116, 437 P.2d 107 (1968).
7 In Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966), the court refused to apply
the law of the situs of the tort, Florida, on the issue of whether a wife could sue her husband in
tort:
The fact that the alleged tortious act took place in Florida is of no significance in
determining which law should govern the determination of this issue. The law of the
place of the wrong should of course determine whether or not a tort has in fact been
committed, but the distinct question of whether one spouse can maintain an action
in tort against the other spouse is clearly a matter which should be governed by the
law of the domicile of the persons involved. . . . Illinois has the predominant in-
terest in the preservation of the relationship. 213 N.E.2d at 545. (Emphasis added.)
But for the emphasized portion, this sounds very much like the "governmental interest" aspect of
the modern rule. In Graham v. General U. S. Grant Post No. 2665, V.F.W., 248 N.E.2d 657, 659
(Ill. 1969), the court expressed recognition of the modern rule and the criticism of the lex loci
delicti, but found that the case did not after all involve a choice of law problem. The issue was
whether to apply the Illinois Dram Shop Act to a case arising from an automobile accident in
Wisconsin, where the drinking was done in Illinois. It held that the Act was not to be given
extraterritorial effect.
Matters were further confused in Karczewski v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 274 F. Supp. 169
(N.D. Ill. 1967) and Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
In Karczewski, at 170, the court categorically stated: "Under Illinois conflict of laws princi-
ples, the law of the place of the tort must determine the substantive law in these circumstances."
The issue was whether a wife could sue in tort for loss of consortium with her husband. The
train-auto accident occurred in Indiana, which prohibited such causes of action. The court held
that Indiana substantive law must be applied. The court held, however, that law was in violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution,
since Indiana allowed a similar cause of action by a husband.
In Manos, the question is even more curious. The court, at 1173, stated: "On the issue of
liability, both parties agree that Italian (site of the airplane accident) law should apply. This is
clearly called for since the applicable Illinois conflict of laws principle points unambiguously to the
law of the place of the tort in order to determine whether in fact a tort was committed."
However, the court refused to apply Italian law to the issue of damages for the death of Illinois
domiciliaries. The court stated: "The predominant interests to be served on the issue of damages
are those of the states containing the people or estates which will receive the recoverable damages,
if any, for their injuries or their decedent's death."
AVIATION GUEST LAWS
Not everyone agrees on what to call this modern rule. Some courts and
writers talk in terms of "contacts,"' while others characterize the rule as
weighing governmental interests and relationships." Be that as it may, the
new rule, at the very least, commands litigants and courts to look at many
other factors than just the fortuitous situs of the crash.'
In Witherspoon v. Salm7' the court stated the rule to be applied in guest
cases in these terms:
We can see no merit in the establishment of a hierarchy of considerations .
Neither should the mere numerical contacts with one State be balanced with
those of another State. Each contact should be evaluated in light of collateral
policy considerations and the particular State interests surrounding the rule
of law.
Hence, the modern rule requires an answer to the question: which state
has the greater interest in having its law applied?
Generally, the policy considerations are:
1. Predictability of results;
2. Maintenance of interstate and international order;
3. Simplification of the judicial task;
4. Advancement of the forum's governmental interests; and,
S. Application of the better rule."
In litigation arising from aircraft accidents, the contacts with the al-
ternative jurisdictions that should be so evaluated are:
1. Domicile of the host;"'
2. Domicile of the guest;
3. Geographic base for the aircraft;
4. Domicile of the heirs of the guest;"9
5. State where the liability insurance, if any, was purchased;"5
6. State where the host-guest relationship was created;"
7. State where the host-guest relationship was intended to terminate;' and
In both Karczewski and Manos the court relied upon Wartell.
Hence, the question arises, would Illinois apply its aviation guest statute to an accident in a
non-guest-statute jurisdiction, where the host and guest are Illinois domiciliaries? The outcome
would appear to hinge upon one's conceptual predilections about what guest statutes really are.
If they are deemed to substantive definitions of when a tort has been committed, then Karczewski
and Manos would suggest that the lex of the loci delicti would apply. If the statute is deemed to
be a special limitation upon a particular relationship, i.e. host-guest, then Wartell would suggest
that Illinois law, including her aviation guest statute, would apply. On the other hand by analogy
to the Dram Shop Act in Graham, if the Illinois Legislature did not contemplate or intend the
aviation guest statute to have extraterritorial effect, then it would not be applicable, even if Illinois
damage law was applied.
"a See Kilberg, supra note 54.
4 See Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966), where the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court refused to apply the Georgia guest law to an aircraft accident in Georgia involving
Pennsylvania domiciliaries and aircraft.
"' See Annotation, Modern Status of Rule That Substantive Rights of Parties to a Tort Action
are Governed by the Law of the Place of the Wrong, 29 A.L.R.3d 603 (1970).
76 Supra note 68, at 124.
"Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579, 583 (1968); see also R. LFXLAR,
AMERICAN CONFLICTs LAW 245 (1968).
71 See Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE L.J. 595, 603 (1959).
70 See Witherspoon, note 68, at 124-25.
'aDe Foor, supra note 71, at 109.
8 See Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625, 627 (1967).
82 Id.
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8. State where the injured persons would be expected to return to for
medical care and treatment."
Where both the law of the accident situs and the forum contain dimin-
ished standards of care to a guest in aircraft operation, there is no true
conflict. In such a situation the choice of the applicable standard would
depend, of course, on the then prevalent conflicts of law rule in the forum.
The more difficult situation exists when either the law of the accident
situs or some other jurisdiction that has any contact with the occurrence
has a guest law, but the forum does not. There the court is squarely faced
with a conflicts of law analysis. Little judicial reasoning is necessary if
the forum adheres to lex loci delicti. The law of the fortuitous accident
site is applied. But where the forum applies the modern rule, which is
approaching the majority rule, the rationale becomes complex.
Where the host and guest have been domiciliaries of the forum, which
has no guest law, the courts of late have refused to apply guest laws of
foreign jurisdictions. 4 This is a relatively pure application of the contacts-
governmental interest rule.
In Kuchinic v. McCrory' the highest court in Pennsylvania, a non-
guest statute jurisdiction, refused to apply the Georgia diminished standard
of care rule to wrongful death and survival actions arising from a light
plane accident in Georgia. The host and guest were domiciliaries of the
forum, the relationship originated in Pennsylvania and was to terminate
there.
In recent years courts in states without guest statutes had refused to
apply foreign guest laws for less mechanical and more realistic reasons.
They have heavily relied upon the fifth policy consideration referred to
above: i.e., application of the better rule of law.
As a general proposition, an eminent scholar in the field of conflicts of
law has concisely expressed the pattern of opinion:
Most courts have always been reluctant to apply a foreign guest statute to
the personal injury claim of a forum citizen against his host-driver. Though
paying lip service to the allegedly ancient lex loci rule, they have been inclined
to give effect to their own common-law rule of full liability. "
In adhering to the "Better-Rule-of-Law" criteria, most courts have been
refreshingly candid. The stage was set in Mullane v. Stavola:8
Any test which gives little or no weight to a 'policy' test is at best artificial.
When courts speak of 'grouping of contacts,' 'center of graviety,' 'paramount
interest,' 'seat of the relationship' or 'fortuitous circumstances,' they are really
attempting to arrive at a selective result. One might with more reason say
rwhat law does justice require be applied?' [Emphasis added.].
83 See Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526, 527-28 (1966).
"'Witherspoon, supra note 68; Mullane v. Stavola, 101 N.J. Super. 184, 243 A.2d 842 (1968);
Conklin, supra note 76; Mellk, supra note 81; Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664
(1967); Kopp, supra note 82; Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Kuchinic
v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897, 899 (1966); Castonzo v. General Cas. Co. of Wis., 251
F. Supp. 948 (W.D. Wis. 1966); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y. 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
85Supra note 84, at Pa. 623-24.
8 Ehrenzweig, Foreign Guest Statutes and Forum Accidents, 68 COLuM. L. REV. 49 (1968).8 7 Supra note 84, at A.2d 845.
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It has been observed that the judicial choice of law process is not a
mechanical selection of one or another jurisdiction without more.' To the
contrary:
Everyone knows that this is not what courts do nor what they should do.
Judges know from the beginning between which rules of law, and not just
what states, they are choosing ...
The inclination of any reasonable court will be to prefer rules of law which
make good socio-economic sense for the time when the court speaks, whether
they be its own or another state's rules.89
New Hampshire and Wisconsin have taken the more direct position and
have unabashedly adopted the "Better-Rule-of-Law" rationale. In Clark
v. Clark," the New Hampshire Supreme Court refused to apply the Ver-
mont automobile guest statute to an action between New Hampshire
domiciliaries arising from a Vermont accident. The court stated:
Finally, we conclude that our rule is preferrable to that of Vermont. The
automobile guest statutes were enacted in about half the states, in the 1920's
and early 1930's, as a result of vigorous pressures by skillful proponents.
Legislative persuasion was largely in terms of guest relationships (hitch-
hikers) and uninsured personal liabilities that are no longer characteristic of
our automobile society. . . . The problems of automobile accident law then
were not what they are today .... Though still on the books, they contradict
the spirit of the times .... Unless other considerations demand it, we should
not go out of our way to enforce such a law of another state as against the
better law of our own state.91
Wisconsin jurisprudence is equally forthright:
We also conclude that Wisconsin's law is the 'better law' to apply under the
circumstances. We have . . . pointed out that the guest statutes are anachron-
istic vestiges of the early days of the development of the law-of-enterprise
liability and do not reflect present-day socio-economic conditions. . . . We
also conclude that such a law is bad law, for its application in those states
where a legislature has put a guest law in effect results in a haven-a sanctuary
-for those who wrongfully cause harm with impunity. We see only legal
retrogression in extending the pernicious effects of such a law to Wisconsin.'
In Heath v. Zellmer," the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled:
'Guest laws' are not consistent with the present-day conditions in the field
of motor-vehicle control and automobile-accident law. . . . We are satisfied,
given the choice, as we are in this case, between the application of Wisconsin's
rule of ordinary negligence and the Indiana (and Ohio) standard of 'wanton
and wilful' conduct that Wisconsin's law is the 'better law.'
In view of Conklin and Heath, it would appear that the Wisconsin
Court has overruled, sub silentio, Gridley v. Cardenas," where it was held
" Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1584,
1587-88 (1966).
89 Id.
90 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
9 1 id. at A.2d 210.
"
2 Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579, 586-87 (1968).
9335 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664, 676 (1967).
943 Wis. 2d 623, 89 N.W.2d 286 (1958).
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that Florida substantive law applied to death actions arising from a light
plane accident in Florida.
Although Clark, Conklin and Heath are clear adaptations of the "Better-
Rule-of-Law" approach to choice of law questions, there still must be
some contact between the forum and the occurrence. Professor Ehrenzweig
has observed:'
Suppose that a guest statute . . . has been recognized by the courts of a
state as the mere product of a strong insurance lobby unconcerned with social
realities and needs. Why should these courts not adopt a rule of choice enabling
them to apply the better rule of either their own or another state, provided
that rule can reasonably be applied as that of the state of the defendant's or
plaintiff's home or of some other contact relevant under the policy of the
forum? [Emphasis added.].
Finally, other jurisdictions have refused to apply foreign guest statutes
after a comparative analysis of the policy considerations behind such
statutes and the lex fori. As indicated above, the primary policy factors
underlying guest statutes are (1) prevention of collusive law suits, and
(2) prevention of ingratitude on the part of the guest.
As to policy (1) the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Wisconsin in Castonzo v. General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin" stated:
Protection against collusive suits is of primary concern, perhaps exclusive
concern, to the forum. Illinois may choose to protect its courts from collu-
sive host-guest suits by applying the 'wilful and wanton' standard to the
guest's claim. Wisconsin chooses not to employ this particular device to
protect its courts from such collusive suits.
However, the court had some hesitation over the second policy considera-
tion; i.e., prevention of ingratitude:
Whether Illinois policy (2) is entitled to vindication in a Wisconsin court is
much more puzzling. The policy of insulating hosts from claims by guest-
passengers is itself puzzling. Is it purely a matter of morals or sentiment that
generous people should not be penalized, or that one who obtains a free ride
is entitled to nothing more?97
Disregarding this policy factor behind guest statutes has caused the
concern of at least one legal writer:-
The insurance collusion interest is clearly inapplicable, but the ingrate argu-
ment remains troublesome. To the extent that the latter supports the rationale
behind guest statutes, the . . . court cannot lightly give it up, or resort to
the 'better law' in multistate contact cases. It might even be contended that
courts are bound to give expression and scope to outmoded or outlandish
policy considerations, especially those cast in moral terms, in direct proportion
to the degree of absurdity of these considerations. For by letting out-of-state
ingrates recover while denying relief to domestic ingrates . . . the forum
undercuts the credibility of its own rule.
9 5 Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts of Law?, 80 HARV. L. REV. 377, 398 (1966).
96251 F. Supp. 948, 952 (W.D. Wis. 1966).97 Id.
98Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflections on Reading Cavers, The
Choice of Law Process, 46 TEx. L. REV. 141, 165-66 (1967).
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However, there appears to be a lighted path through the darkness of
weighing policy considerations:
Current social attitudes about host-guest statutes, especially in states that
enacted them a long time ago, are relevant not only to judicial reinterpreta-
tion of the statutes but also to choice-of-law decisions concerning them, and
may well influence a court in deciding which state has the most significant
relationship to a complicated fact situation."'
Hence, it is suggested that the court look beyond the states policies that
affected the legislative process at the time of enactment. The court should
attempt to judge the current climate of social, economic and jurispru-
dential thought in the foreign state regarding its guest statute. The details
of how this is to be done goes beyond the scope of this discourse.
Suffice it to say that New Jersey has not been troubled with the "ingrate"
policy consideration:
The strong New Jersey policy of allowing an injured guest to sue his host
for negligence under such circumstances is not diminished merely because the
accident occurred in another state. The desire of Ohio to prevent collusive
suits and suits by 'ungrateful' guests applies to persons living in its state,
defendants insuring motor vehicles there, and persons suing in its courts.
Recovery for negligence in this action will not transgress these purposes in
any way, will not frustrate the concerns which prompted the Ohio Legislature
to enact a guest statute, and will not in the slightest impair traffic safety
in Ohio.' [Emphasis added.].
In summary, it can be said that guest law cases have been in the eye
of the hurricane of the revolution in conflict of laws rules. Where the
forum presently retains the lex loci delicti doctrine and the aircraft acci-
dent occurs in one of the sixteen jurisdictions with aviation guest statutes
or in Georgia," ' then there will be applied the appropriate diminished
standard of care to the guests', or his heirs', claims against the airman or
his estate. If the accident occurred in Massachusetts, it would appear to
be open to doubt as to whether the Massachusetts rule of gross negligence
would be applied.0 " If the forum has rejected the lex loci rule, and has its
own aviation guest statute, then it appears safe to say that if there are
no contacts with a third jurisdiction that has no such guest law, then the
forum will apply one or the other of the vaiation guest laws.
Very interesting questions would arise where the forum has adopted
one or another version of the modern rule and has an aviation guest law,
but the law of the situs does not. Would the forum give its guest law
extraterritorial effect by choice of law reasoning? Similarly, what would
or should the forum do when certain significant contacts point to a juris-
diction other than the forum or the accident situs that has an aviation
guest statute? The recent California case, Reich v. Purcell"° would suggest
that the law of the third jurisdiction be given effect. There the Supreme
"9 Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267, 307 (1966).
... Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625, 627 (1967).
'0' See Sammons v. Webb, supra note 19.
... For a discussion of the problem see supra note 20.
10367 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727 (1967).
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Court refused to apply the Missouri monetary limit on wrongful death
damages in an action arising from an accident in Missouri involving Ohio
domiciliaries on their way to California. Neither Ohio nor California had
monetary limits on death damages. Possibly Reich could be distinguished
on the ground that money damages had a more immediate and direct im-
pact upon the socio-economic concerns of the third jurisdiction than would
extra-territorial application of its diminished standard of conduct in air-
craft operation in or over another state.
So much for these general and correlated problems created by aviation
guest laws. Let us now open Pandora's Box and take a look at the meaning
of the particular provisions of these laws.
IV. STATUS
A. Introduction
The threshold issue of fact in each aviation guest case is whether the
rider is a "guest" within the purview of the applicable law. General state-
ments of the rules are deceiving. Each factual circumstance must be treated
on its own terms. Be that as it may, if there is to be predictability in this
area of tort law we must strive to derive lessons from past litigation and
judicial construction of guest laws. Once again it will be necessary to look
to the experiences in the field of automobile guest law.
The issues regarding the status of the rider in an aircraft are:
1. Was the host-guest relationship properly created?
2. Did the rider confer upon the owner or pilot a sufficient tangible benefit
so as to render himself a "passenger" instead of a "guest?,''
1
3. Was the host-guest relationship terminated before the aircraft accident?
B. fGuest"
Each jurisdiction with an aviation guest law has many times tried to
define the term "guest." The Restatement, Second, Torts' 5 has attempted
a general definition:
The word 'guest' is used to denote one whom the owner or possessor of a
motor car or other vehicle invites or permits to ride with him as a gratuity,
that is, without any financial return except such slight benefits as it is cus-
tomary to extend as part of the courtesies of the road.
This conforms with the common-law definition applied in Georgia. "
In each of the sixteen jurisdictions with aviation guest laws created by
statute there is some statutory language that attempts to define "guest."
All states agree that where a rider fails to render unto the owner or operator
104 Terminology becomes very important at this stage of a guest case. Hence, for clarification
the following impromptu definitions should be adopted: A "rider" is anyone in the aircraft, who
is not operating it and who may be either a "guest" or "passenger." A "guest" is a rider that does
not meet the standards of the applicable guest law to become a "passenger," and must, therefore,
show a greater degree of culpability on the part of the host than ordinary negligence. A "passenger"
is a "rider" who has, as of the time of the accident, shown that the particular aviation guest law
is not applicable to the litigation. Hence, he is a "rider" to whom the host owes the common-law
duty of ordinary care.
105§ 490, comment a.
'0 Nash v. Reed, 81 Ga. App. 473, $9 S.E.2d 259, 261 (950).
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of the aircraft any "payment" or "compensation," then the rider may be
a "guest." Unfortunately, there is little consistency or harmony in the
various aviation guest law jurisdictions as to what constitutes "payment"
or "compensation." That problem will be discussed shortly.
There is agreement that the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion and
proof regarding his status, "guest" or "passenger," in the aircraft at the
time of the accident.'M
The first phase of this aspect of aviation guest cases is to determine
whether, in fact, the host-guest relationship was ever created prior to the
aircraft accident.
C. Creation of Host-Guest Relationship
At the outset it should be noted that whether or not there is a host-guest
relationship may depend upon factors other than whether the rider con-
ferred "payment" or "compensation" upon the pilot or owner. The Oregqn
Supreme Court stated the rule in these concise terms: 1"
... the absence of a substantial benefit to the driver is not the sole criterion
to be used in determining the host-guest relationship under the statute . . .
A person is not a guest unless he is transported without payment and he is
also a guest in other respects.
Later we'll look into what "payment" means. For now, let us consider
what "other respects" the court was referring to.
All aviation guest statutes utilize the term "guest." Some courts have
construed that term to mean that there must be someone with the legal
capacity to extend an invitation to ride in the vehicle, auto or aircraft. In
Spring v. Liles" the Oregon court stated:
The relation of host and guest presupposes (1) that the host has a right to
extend hospitality to the guest at the particular place where he is invited
to be present, and (2) that an invitation, expressed or implied, has been
given.
Indiana"' has also so ruled and went one step further:
. . . all of these definitions contemplate both an invitation on the part of
the owner and an acceptance on the part of the guest of such invitation....
The Nebraska..' aviation guest statute expressly defines "guest" as "a
person who accepts a ride. . . ." California,"' Georgia, " ' Michigan,"" and
Oregon 1"' also require that the host's invitation be accepted.
"'Whittemore v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 65 Cal. App. 2d 737, 740, 151 P.2d 670 (1944);
De Joseph v. Faraone, 254 A.2d 257, 260 (Del. 1969); Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 103 Ill. App. 2d
469, 243. N.E.2d 616, 621 (1968); Birmelin v. Gist, 162 Ohio St. 98, 120 N.E.2d 711 (1954);
Senechal v. Bauman, 232 Ore. 217, 375 P.2d 60, 63 (1962); Guyton v. Guyton, 244 S.C. 357, 137
S.E.2d 273 (1964).
"'Spring v. Liles, 236 Ore. 140, 387 P.2d 578, 580 (1963).
"09Id. at 580-81.
"'Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407, 31 N.E.2d 670, 672 (1941).
"'. See Appendix.
.. aRocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. 2d 245, 44 P.2d 478 (1935).
"' Wood v. Morris, 109 Ga. App. 148, 135 S.E.2d 484, 486 (1964).
114Burhans v. Witbeck, 375 Mich. 253, 134 N.W.2d 225 (1965).
115 Senechal, supra note 107, at P.2d 61; Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396, 399, 216 P.2d 262
(1950).
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Ohio... has expressly rejected the consensual theory of the host-guest
relationship. Hence, there would appear to be no reason to show that the
driver had the capacity to extend the invitation and that the rider had
the capacity to accept. Arkansas,"' Delaware,' Idaho,"' Illinois,"' South
Dakota,"' and Utah 2 ' appear to impliedly reject the consensual theory.
Hence, in those jurisdictions that have adopted the consensual theory of
the host-guest relationship, the first issue is whether the defendant had the
legal standing to extend an invitation to ride in the aircraft. This issue
usually arises when the operator is not the legal or registered owner of the
vehicle. In this instance, two questions arise: first, can an owner-rider
become a "guest" of the non-owner-operator of his aircraft?" Secondly,
does the non-owner-operator of the aircraft have the capacity to extend
an invitation to a non-owner third party?
In regard to a riding owner the hospitality usually flows from the owner
to the operator. Hence, the weight of authority in general," and partic-
ularly in those jurisdictions with aviation guest laws," is that an owner
may not be a guest in his own vehicle.
Ohio.. and South Dakota.. appear to follow a variant rule. There a
riding owner is on no different ground than any other rider. He would
be required to prove that he was not a "guest."
Parenthetically, it should be noted that Idaho,"' Illinois,"' Michigan''
and North Dakota"' have expressly held that an owner who temporarily
turns control of the vehicle to a "guest" does not automatically terminate
the host-guest relationship. The owner remains the host, and the guest in
control owes him the duty of ordinary care.
The second issue; i.e., whether a non-owner operator has the capacity
to extend an invitation to a non-owner, creates a more intriguing question.
"' Kemp v. Parmley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 3, 241 N.E.2d 169 (1968); Lombardo v. DeShance, 167
Ohio St. 431, 149 N.E.2d 914, 918 (1958).
... Tilghman v. Rightor, 211 Ark. 229, 199 S.W.2d 943, 945 (1947).
"'Lynott v. Sells, 52 Del. 385, 158 A.2d 583, 585 (1958).
"'Petersen v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647, 448 P.2d 653 (1968).
220 Roesnbaum, supra note 107.
' Mitzel v. Hauck, 78 S.D. 543, 105 N.W.2d 378 (1960).
"' Favatella v. Poulsen, 17 Utah 2d 24, 403 P.2d 918 (1965).
.2 See Comment, Can a Person Be a 'Guest' in his own Car?, 38 U. COLo. L. REv. 346 (1966);
Note, 9 S.D. L. REv. 204 (1964); Comment, 17 Sw. L.J. 298 (1963); Note, 32 S. CAL. L. REV.
93 (1958); Annotation, Guest Statute as Applicable to Member of Family Riding in Car Driven
by Another Member, 2 A.L.R.2d 932 (1948); Annotation, Vehicle Owner or His Agent Having
General Right of Possession and Control as Guest of Driver Within Automobile Guest Statute or
Similar Rule, 65 A.L.R.2d 312 (1959); Annotation, Burden of Pleading and Proving Guest Status,
or Absence Thereof, under Automobile Guest Statute, 24 A.L.R.3d 1400 (1969).
"1 See Annotation, Vehicle Owner or His Agent Having General Right of Possession and Control
as Guest of Driver Within Automobile Guest Sttatute or Similar Rule, 65 A.L.R.2d 312 (1959).
"'Wilson v. Workman, 192 F. Supp. 852, 854 (D. Del. 1961); Peterson v. Winn, 84 Idaho
523, 373 P.2d 925, 928 (1928); Summers v. Summers, 40 Il. 2d 338, 239 N.E.2d 795 (1968);
Baldwin v. Hill, 315 F.2d 738, 742 (6th Cir. 1963) (applying Michigan law); see also Froemke
v. Hauff, 147 N.W.2d 390, 402-03 (N.D. 1966).
12 Thomas v. Hurron, 20 Ohio St. 62, 253 N.E.2d 772, 774 (1969); Henline v. Wilson, 111
Ohio App. 515, 174 N.E.2d 122 (1960).
... Schlim v. Gau, 8 S.D. 403, 125 N.W.2d 174, 178 (1963); Phelps v. Benson, 252 Minn. 457,
469, 90 N.W.2d 533 (1958) (applying South Dakota's automobile guest statute).
12 Peterson, supra note 125.
129 Summers, supra note 125.
... Baldwin, supra note 125.
131 Froemke, supra note 12 5.
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California' and Michigan' have faced this question in regard to their
automobile guest statutes. The California court held that:
If one is to be a guest in a vehicle and 'accept' a ride therein there must be a
host who can extend an invitation for the ride. The evidence here establishes
that the defendant could not and did not achieve the status of a host. He
did not own the vehicle. He did not borrow the car or rent it, and did not
have charge of it. He did not propose the trip. He was in no position to
extend an invitation to anyone to ride with him."'
There the rider was the wife of the owner and the defendant was travel-
ing and driving at the request of the plaintiff.
In Baldwin v. Hill" the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reached a similar result. There the plaintiff was the daughter
of the owner, who was not in the vehicle, and invited the defendant to
drive. The court held that as a matter of law the plaintiff was the "host"
and not the operator-defendant.
The second half of the consensual theory of the host-guest relationship
requires a showing that the rider had the capacity to accept the invitation
and did in fact make such an acceptance. The more frequent context in
which this question emerges is where the rider is a minor.' Once again,
there is lack of uniformity among those states having aviation guest laws.
Those states rejecting the consensual theory hold that the legal incapacity
of the rider, by reason of his minority, will not, as a matter of law, pre-
clude application of the guest statute. Ohio has gone so far as to hold
that the incapacity of the rider to accept the invitation, which resulted
from his intoxication, would not prevent application of the automobile
guest statute. "
California, '  Georgia, 5  Indiana," Michigan" ° and Oregon 4' have
squarely held that a minor of tender years does not have the legal capacity
to accept an invitation to ride from a bonafide host. In Michigan a child
under seven is presumed legally incompetent and cannot consent to any
rider." However, a child over seven does not as a matter of law possess
insufficient ability, intelligence or experience to knowingly accept a ride.'
In Wood v. Morris' a Georgia court went one step further and held that
152Whitehill v. Strickland, 256 Cal. App. 2d 837, 840-41, 64 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1967).
"' Baldwin, supra note 125.
'
5 4 Whitehill, supra note 132, at Cal. App. 2d 840.
"
5 4
'Baldwin, supra note 125.
"
8 See Note, 46 VA. L. REV. 1615, 1617-18 (1960); Comment, 8 DRAKE L. REv. 156 (1958);
Note, 7 KAN. L. REV. 204, 205 (1958); Comment, The Ohio Guest Statute, 10 U. CrIN. L. REV.
289, 298-99 (1936); Annotation, Infant as Guest Within Automobile Guest Statutes, 16 A.L.R.2d
1304 (1951).
136 Lombardo, supra note 116; see Annotation, Intoxication, Unconsciousness, or Mental Incom-
petency of Person as Affecting his Status as Guest Within -Automobile Guest Statute or Similar
Common-Law Rule, 66 A.L.R'2d 1319 (1959).
"m Rocha, supra note 112.
a Wood, supra note 113.
1 Fuller, supra note 110.
140 Kelly v. Bywater, 18 Mich. App. 238, 171 N.W.2d 58 (1969).
4' Kudrna, supra note 115.
'"Burhans, supra note 114.
'43 Kelly, supra note 140, at N.W.2d 59.
144Supra note 113, at S.E.2d 484.
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an eleven year old girl was "legally incapable of giving the necessary
consent and accepting the invitation. .. ."
California,' Georgia,' " Indiana' 7 and Oregon" have modified their
infant-capacity rule. Where the infant's legal guardian, parent or other-
wise, has accepted the host's invitation, either expressly or impliedly by
also participating in the ride, then that act of violation will be imputed
to the infant and the child may become a "guest."
An interesting hybrid of the consensual theory has occurred in Oregon.
In Spring v. Liles,' the plaintiff was required to ride in the defendant's
car because of a problem that arose from their common employment. There
was no extension of hospitality in the nature of a friendly invitation to
take a ride. The court held that a host-guest relationship was never created:
Even in the absence of a benefit to the defendant, the plaintiff is a passenger
(as distinguished from a guest) if his presence in the vehicle does not arise
primarily from the hospitality of the defendant .... Plaintiff and defendant
were thrown together because a problem arose incident to their common
employment. We do not believe that this is the type of motivation bringing
a driver and passenger together which characterizes the creation of the host-
guest relationship. [Emphasis added.].
Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court has rendered an opinion that is
closely related to the matter of consensual acceptance of a host's invitation
that may find important applications in aviation guest causes. In Coffinan
v. Godsoe'" the court clearly adopted the consensual theory of the host-
guest relationship in these terms:
... the relationship of driver and guest is consensual in its nature and involves
conscious acceptance by the guest of the status or relationship with its attend-
ant hazards.'
The court pointed out that "one does not stand in the guest relation-
ship where the circumstances of passenger relationship arises involuntarily
or forcibly."'' 2 The issue before the court was:
Whether misrepresentations, which operate as an inducement to one to become
a passenger, produce a like legal effect as that which follows from the exer-
cise of force or the existence of incapacity.'
Therein the defendant made false and fraudulent statements as to his
authority and ability to drive the vehicle. The court ruled that plaintiff's
acceptance was based on these misrepresentations The court held that:
Involuntary acceptance of transportation operates to avoid the element of
consent which is essential to existence of the guest status.'"
145Buckner v. Vetterick, 124 Cal. App. 2d 417, 269 P.2d 67 (1954).
146 Chancey v. Cobb, i02 Ga. App. 636, 117 S.E.2d 189, 192-93 (1960).
4
"Whitfield v. Bruegel, 134 Ind. App. 636, 190 N.E.2d 670, 672 (1963).
4
"Welker v. Sorenson, 209 Ore. 402, 306 P.2d 737 (1957).
14Supra note 108, at P.2d 582-83.
"'o 142 Colo. 575, 351 P.2d 808 (1960); see also Note, 46 VA. L. REv. 1615 (1960).
1'xSupra note 150, at P.2d 812.
'.3 Id.
153 id.
54Id. at P.2d 813.
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The analogy is clear. By application of the courts rationale in Coffman,
it can be argued that where a rider in an aircraft is induced into accepting
the pilot's invitation by misrepresentations made by the pilot about his
training and ability or the flight conditions to be encountered, then the
plaintiff should be allowed to obviate that acceptance and recover without
regard to any applicable aviation guest law. In essence, the rider was in-
voluntarily thrust into the situation by the misconduct of the pilot, who
should not be allowed to profit from his initial misdeeds."'
It is submitted that one of the considerations underlying the consensual
theory's rationale is that before a rider will be deemed to have waived his
common-law right to be free from redress of an injury caused by lack of
ordinary care, he must show that he had sufficient capacity to appreciate
the dangers and hazards incident to operation of such vehicles in a careless
manner. In Coffman the court recognized this principle:
Recovery for injuries caused by simple negligence is denied a guest because
of his nonpaying status. It is said that he is the recipient of a gratuitous
benefit conferred on him by the owner or operator of the vehicle. By reason of
this the statute requires the guest to accept the hazards created by the ordi-
nary negligence of the host. By agreeing to accept the free transportation,
he is to waive his right to recover for injuries occasioned by the simple negli-
gence of the driver.a"'
If in fact it is waiver that we are talking about, then why should the
plaintiff not be allowed to show that by reason of his lack of experience
with and knowledge of aircraft operations, he was totally unable to know,
understand or appreciate the hazards to his personal security of careless
aircraft operation? It is axiomatic in the law that one cannot waive that
which he does not know. With the intense modern utilization of automo-
biles, it is easy to imply about their hazards, but such is not the case with
aircraft. Certainly if the pilot makes any misrepresentations about "safe"
flying, and the unknowing rider is induced to accept the invitation to ride,
it would seem fair and just to vitiate the acceptance and let the rider re-
cover on the basis of the airman's simple negligence.
Let us turn now to one of the aspects of the host-guest relationship
that has generated a great deal of the litigation heretofore; to wit, has the
rider rendered unto the operator or owner a "payment" or "compensation"
for the ride or the transportation?
D. "Payment" or "Compensation"
Heretofore, a "guest" was defined in part as one who rides in a vehicle
gratuitously. Conversely, if the rider confers upon the pilot or owner a
Itpayment" or "compensation" for the ride, he is freed from his guest
status and the aircraft operator owes him the common-law duty of ordi-
nary care under the circumstances. Where this demarcation is in any given
case is an issue sui generis to that suit. Here is where the scholarly generali-
zations and definitions that have survived fifty-three years of experience
.. See Weber, Guest Statutes, 11 CIN. L. REv. 24, 45 (1937).
15SCoffman, supra note 150, at P.2d 811-12.
1970]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
with guest laws simply break down when applied to particular factual
situations.
Although there are more aviation guest cases" ' dealing with this issue
than others, it is still helpful to look at judicial determinations under the
automobile guest laws. In all jurisdictions, save Illinois, the statutory or
decisional basis for "payment" or "compensation" is identical for both the
automobile and aviation guest laws. Illinois statutorially prohibits suits
between joint venturers while riding in automobiles, but has no similar
provision in the aviation guest statute. Nor does there appear to be any
unique or unusual aspect of air travel that would suggest different rules of
law regarding what is a sufficient "payment" or "compensation" under
the guest laws. Litigation involving this issue has been extensive."
It is uniformly held that "payment" or "compensation" means confer-
ring upon the operator or owner some benefit."' In Michigan"'0 the courts
look to the "pecuniary" nature of the "benefit." The majority of the juris-
dictions with aviation guest statutes define "benefit" in terms of being
"tangible" or "substantial. '61 In Whittemore v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,
the Court summarized the "benefit" concept very concisely:
This compensation may consist of any benefit of a tangible nature received
by the (operator) as a consideration for the ride. Obviously if the rider parts
with nothing but goes along solely for his own pleasure or in pursuit of
his own business and not in aid of the business of the operator or the common-
business of the two, he is a mere guest. Where the claimed compensation con-
sists only of some business advantage or benefit which will accrue to the
operator, in order to take one out of the guest class, it must be of a practical
and tangible nature identified definitely with the business purposes of the
operator of the vehicle.
The courts, particularly in California1" and Oregon,' have been very
liberal in interpreting the concept of "benefit" in favor of the rider. The
Oregon Supreme Court went so far as to hold that the "payment" need
not be a material benefit to the operator."' The legislature responded by
... Doyle v. Hamren, 246 Cal. App. 2d 733, 55 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1966); Stiles v. American Trust
Co., 137 Cal. App. 2d 472, 290 'P.2d 614 (1955); Halbert v. Berlinger, 127 Cal. App. 2d 6, 273
P.2d 274 (1954); Whittemore v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 65 Cal. App. 2d 737, 151 P.2d 670(1944); Marshall v. First American Nat. Bank, 91 Ill. App. 2d 47, 233 N.E.2d 430 (1968);
United States v. Alexander, 234 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 892 (applying
Indiana law); Lightenburger v. Gordon, 81 Nev. 553, 407 P.2d 728 (1965); DeFoor v. Lematta,
249 Ore. 116, 437 P.2d 107 (1968); Middleton v. Cox, - Utah 2d -, - P.2d -' 11
Av. Cas. 17,430 (February 5, 1970).
'
16 See 20 A.L.R. 1014 (1922); 26 A.L.R. 1425 (1923); 40 A.L.R. 1338 (1926); 47 A.L.R.
327 (1927); 51 A.L.R. 581 (1927); 61 A.L.R. 1252 (1929); 65 A.L.R. 952 (1930); 146
A.L.R. 640 (1943); 146 A.L.R. 682 (1943); 10 A.L.R.2d 1351 (1950).
'i Hart v. Wielt, 4 Cal. App. 3d 224, 235, - Cal. Rptr. _ (1970); Whittemore v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 51 Cal. App. 2d 605, 609, 125 P.2d 531 (1942); Note, 3 Wyo. L.J.
225, 226 (1949); Note, Guest and Secondary Liabilities in Private Aviation, 30 IOWA L. Rnv.
442, 446 (1945).
.. Shumaker v. Kline, 333 Mich. 346, 53 N.W.2d 295 (1952).
s' Whittemore, supra note 159; Born v. Matzner's Estate, 159 Neb. 169, 65 N.W.2d 593(1954).
16a Id.
163 See Hardman, Aviation Guest Statutes, INs. L.J. 561, 565 (1962); Comment, 26 CAL. L.
REV. 251. 252 (1938).
1
64 Skow v. Skulps, 224 Ore. 548, 356 P.2d 521 (1960); Johnson v. Kolovos, 224 Ore. 266,
355 P.2d 1115 (1960).16 See Skow and Johnson, supra note 164.
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amending the Oregon guest statute. In 1961 the following definition of
"payment" was added:
'Payment' means a substantial benefit in a material or business sense conferred
upon the owner or operator....
The "benefit" need not be a legally enforceable agreement."'
As indicated in the Oregon statute, the benefit must flow in favor of
the operator, his agent or principal or the owner.' Where the benefit
favors another rider, not the operator, there is no payment and the guest
statute applies."' On the other hand, the benefit to the operator or owner
need not come directly from the rider."9 It may come from a third party
to the rider.
The "benefit" need not be exclusively in money or any other concrete
manifestation of value.' Clearly it can be in the form of services rendered
or to be rendered by the rider or someone else so as to benefit the operator."'
However, where the operator does not request the rider's services, and the
rider goes along and voluntarily performs such services, it has been held that
the rider was a guest. "' Whatever the nature of the benefit, it is agreed
that it may be realized after commencement of the ride or transportation.' 3
However, where the realization is prospective it must be more than a mere
possibility.' There is also agreement among the aviation guest law juris-
dictions that the benefit conferred, or to be conferred, upon the operator
must be a motivating influence upon the operator for taking along the
rider.' Oregon as gone so far as to amend its statute to require that the
payment be "a substantial motivating factor for the transportation."
These general rules of law have been applied to aviation accident litiga-
tion. In De Foor v. Lematta," the plaintiff was held to be a passenger as
a matter of law where he had bought a helicopter through the defendant,
who was to return to Oregon with the plaintiff after delivery in Culver
City, California. The plaintiff paid all the travel costs. The accident oc-
curred in California during a side trip to the plaintiff's ranch. It is interest-
ing to note that the plaintiff was the president of the corporate ow the heli-
copter at the time of the accident. As a result of the court's ruling that the
166 Haney v. Takamura, 2 Cal. App. 2d 1, 37 P.2d 170 (1934); Friedhoff v. Engberg, 149
N.W.2d 759 (S.D. 1967); Note, 4 HoUSTON L. REv. 690, 693 (1967).
167 Halbert, supra note 157; Connett v. Wingett, 303 Ill. App. 227, 25 N.E.2d 116 (1940);
Shumaker, supra note 160; Born, supra note 161; Voelkl v. Latin, 58 Ohio App. 245, 16 N.E.2d
519 (1938).
168Connett, supra note 167.
16Thompson v. Lacey, 42 Cal. 2d 443, 267 P.2d 1 (1954); Born, supra note 161; Sprenger
v. Braker, 49 N.E.2d 958 (Ohio App. 1942).
'
1 6 Ahlgren v. Ahlgren, 185 Cal. App. 2d 216, 220, 8 CaL Rptr. 218 (1960) ; Cluts v. Peterson,
11-3 N.W.2d 273 (S.D. 1962).
17' Kruzie v. Sanders, 23 Cal. 2d 237, 143 P.2d-704 (1943); Lerma v..Flores, 16 Cal.:App. 2d
1928, 60 P.2d 546 (1936); Voelkl, supra note 167.
172 Yates v. J.H. Krumlinde & Co., 22 Cal. App. 2d 387, 71 P.2d 298 (1937).
173 Doyle, supra note 157; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stitzle, 41 N.E.2d 133 (Ind. 1942).
174 U.S. v. Alexander, supra note 157, at 867.
73 Whittemore, supra note 159; Dirksmeyer v. Barnes, 2 II. App. 2d 496, 119 N.E.2d 813
(1954); Dick v. Carey, 408 F.2d 555, 556 (7th Cir. 1969) (applying Indiana' law); Lighten-
burger, supra note 157, at Nev. 567; Born, supra note 161; Gunderson v. Sopiwnik, 66 N.W.2d
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plaintiff-rider was a passenger, it was unnecessary for the court to consider
whether the non-owner-pilot had the capacity to become a host. When
we consider that as part of the purchase, the defendant obligated himself
to teach the plaintiff how to operate the helicopter, it is clear that the de-
fendant was receiving a direct pecuniary benefit from the plaintiff in
exchange for the ride; i.e., earnings from the sale.
Doyle v. Hamren'" involved the crash of Piper Comanche into San
Francisco Bay on the return leg to Sacramento from a business trip to
San Francisco. The purpose of the trip was to make arrangements for a
business venture. The pilot was to be manager. The plaintiff's dectdent was
one of the members of the joint enterprise. Further, the trip was necessary
to the accomplishment of the business venture. The court ruled that the
plaintiff's decedent was a "passenger," and not a "guest," as a matter of
law. 7' This is a good example of a prospective benefit. Apparently the court
was persuaded that the probability of the fulfillment of the proposed busi-
ness venture was more than a mere possibility.
Similarly, in Halberi v. Berlinger... the court held that the evidence
was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the riders were "passengers"
and not "guests," where the corporate owner of the aircraft, which was
being piloted by the president of the corporation, expected to receive a
benefit from the flight. The rider and another had needed certain con-
struction work performed. The matter was discussed with the pilot, who
was in the construction business and who suggested that he fly the rider to
inspect the job sites. After that the pilot suggested that they go hunting.
It was during the hunting portion of the trip that the accident occurred.
The probability of fulfillment of the prospective benefit here was much
less than in the Doyle case. Realistically, that is probably why the issue
was couched in terms of substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict
for the plaintiffs.
Whitmore v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.' presents another case involving
the purchase and delivery of an aircraft. There the plaintiff's decedent was
to accept delivery of the aircraft in Las Vegas, Nevada for his employer,
Northwest Airlines, Inc. Instead of going directly to Las Vegas, he went
to the defendant's plant in Burbank, California. He was known to have
accepted delivery of the defendant's aircraft in the past. It was admitted
that neither the plaintiff's decedent nor his employer made any special cash
payment for the ride from Burbank to Las Vegas. The court reasoned
thusly:
. . . defendant must be deemed to have received compensation if he was
taken along because it was considered by defendant to be to its business
advantage that he be taken to Las Vegas in the plane."
The court observed that it was obviously to the defendant's advantage
177v Id.
17' Id. at Cal. App. 2d 739.
79 Supra note 157.
1"' Supra notes 157 and 159.
181 Supra note 159.
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to get the plaintiff's decedent to Las Vegas so he could take delivery of the
aircraft. In addition, Lockheed was interested in promoting the goodwill
and patronage of Northwest Airlines. Hence, carriage of the plaintiff's de-
cedant was conducive to the maintenance of that beneficial relationship.
The court's position is a frank recognition of business realities. It is sub-
mitted that the strongest rationale for the court's ruling is the preservation
of goodwill between the defendant and Northwest Airlines. It should be
noted that the recipient of the benefit was not the pilot, but his corporate
employer. Likewise, it is noteworthy that the giver of the benefit was not
the plaintiff's decedent, but his employer.
A clear example of a prospective benefit is the demonstration drive or
flight by the seller or manufacturer. Delaware, Michigan, Nebraska, North
Dakota, and Oregon expressly exclude demonstration flights from the guest
statute. California"' cases have held such demonstration rides to be a
sufficient benefit so as to preclude application of the guest statute without
regard to whether the sale was actually consummated.
There are, however, some aviation guest cases where the court failed to
find any benefit and, thus, held the guest statutes applicable. Lighten-
burger v. Gordon'" involved the crash of a Cessna 310 during approach
into Los Angeles International Airport. The court looked to California
law and engrafted it onto that of Nevada, and considered that Nevada
law applied, since the host-guest relationship originated in Nevada. The
rider was an employee of a third party that sought to make sales to the
owner of the aircraft. The seller had arranged for a commercial flight to
Los Angeles to carry out the transaction. Apparently upon learning of
these arrangements, Gordon, president of the owner of the aircraft, per-
suaded Lightenburger to fly to Los Angeles in his aircraft. The court recog-
nized the rule that a benefit may be sufficient although prospective. "
However, it held that any benefits to be realized by Gordon and his cor-
poration would have been realized without regard to the use of the cor-
porate aircraft. The business activity to be accomplished in Los Angeles
had already been arranged. The services of Lightenburger had already been
committed. All the court could find was a mere convenience to Gordon,
which did not rise to the dignity of a "benefit." One lesson to be drawn
from Litchenburger is that any benefit flowing to the pilot or owner must
be related to the particular flight.
Two aviation guest statute cases illustrate one aspect of the concept of
"benefit" that is unrelated to commercial dealings. In Stiles v. American
Trust Co.,'8 ' the pilot had a habit of flying into a rural northern California
community in which he owned a ranch. One of the plaintiff's friends agreed
the ride to the airport, they came upon the plaintiff walking along tht road.
The plaintiff's friend asked the pilot if the plaintiff could go along. The
pilot agreed. The court held that any benefit conferred upon the pilot by
.. Riley v. Berkeley Motors, Inc., 1 Cal. App. 2d 217, 36 P.2d 398 (1934), Crawford v.
Foster, 110 Cal. App. 81, 293 P. 841 (1930).
's3 SuPra note 157.
184 Lightenburger, supra note 157, at Nev. 568.
" Supra note 157.
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reason of the services of the plaintiff's friend would not be deemed to have
been rendered in behalf of the plaintiff. The pilot had no idea that when he
agreed to take the friend up, that the plaintiff would be included. The use
of the car was in no way predicated upon the pilot's taking the plaintiff for
a ride. His status as a rider was totally unforeseeable by the pilot when he
struck his bargain. Stiles suggests a very important limitation upon the rule
concerning a benefit supplied by a third party; to wit, must the existence
of the particular rider be reasonably forseeable at the time? Also, it is an
example of an anomaly created by aviation guest statutes-one rider may
be a "guest" while his companion in the aircraft may be a "passenger."
The second case, Marshall v. First American Nat'l Bank,"6 is useful for
illustrative purposes only, since the court came to no definitive decision on
the "benefit" issue. The plaintiff had previously left his airplane in Illinois
and had driven back to Tennessee because of bad weather. Apparently he
made a deal with the pilot to fly him back to pick up his aircraft. During
this flight the accident occurred. The pilot was killed, but the plaintiff sur-
vived. His testimony regarding the prearranged agreement relating to ex-
penses with the pilot was equivocal, but he did testify without hesitancy
that the pilot welcomed the opportunity "to get some flying time in his air-
plane on cross-country flights, as he would like to gain some instrument
time. 187 Query: would the plaintiff's offer, without regard to the amount to
be paid, which gave the pilot an otherwise unavailable opportunity to get
flight time and improve his skills, be a sufficient "benefit" to withdraw
the plaintiff from the guest status?
The only hint of the court's unexpressed opinion comes from the pro-
cedural context of the case. The plaintiff had appealed from an adverse
judgment entered after a jury verdict for the defendant. The judgment was
reversed because of evidentiary errors which were sufficiently prejudicial,
and remanded for new trial. However, the plaintiff had pleaded only simple
negligence and "compensation." Hence, if there was no "benefit" shown
in the record before the court, then it would have been relatively futile
to remand for new trial. The point was not discussed in the opinion.
Finally, there have been two reported cases involving activities by the
Civil Air Patrol (CAP). In United States v. Alexander," the issue con-
cerned prospective benefits to be conferred upon the CAP by the rider.
The CAP had offered a courtesy ride to a professional golfer, who it hoped
would participate in a benefit golf tournament to raise funds for the
Patrol. The court ruled that he was a "guest." The court's reasoning was
thus:
The mere possibility that the flight would result in material gain to the CAP
in connection with an interprise which was still in the tentative stage was
too insubstantial to alter the status of Alexander as a non-paying guest." 9
The second CAP case has more significant ramifications. On 5 February
186 Id.
18 Supra note 157, at Ill. App. 2d 50.
'8' Supra note 157.
189 Supra note 157, at 867.
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1970 the Utah Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Middleton v. Cox."°
An accident occurred during a volunteer search and rescue mission being
conducted by the CAP for a lost aircraft. Cox piloted an aircraft involved
in the search. He needed an observer to comply with the pertinent regula-
tions, and Middleton volunteered to go with him. The majority of the
court held, with virtually no discussion, that the rider was a "guest." In
a concurring opinion by one justice and a dissenting opinion by another,
the holding of the majority on this point was hotly contested. The former
argued that the relationship between Cox and Middleton was more like
"a joint enterprise to perform a service for the benefit of someone else and
at the request of third parties."''. The latter adopted the consensual theory
of the host-guest relationship and argued that unless there was a "giving"
of an invitation for the ride, then the host-guest relationship was never
created, without regard to "payment" or "compensation." In the alterna-
tive the dissenter argued that Cox did receive a sufficient benefit, albeit
from a third party; i.e., the CAP. Cox owned the plane being used and
he was being reimbursed by the CAP for expenses incurred in connection
with the flight. Without Middleton or someone else as observer, Cox would
not have been able to participate in the search according to the applicable
regulations. Query: did the presence of the observer in his aircraft permit
Cox the personal enjoyment of participating in the humane mission? If
so, cannot such personal gratification constitute a sufficient "benefit?"
It is submitted that too many questions were left unresolved by the opinion
of the majority.
The Middleton case introduces three closely related aspects of the
concept of "benefit." Most directly, it brings forth the question of the
status of the parties when the purpose of the ride or transportation is the
promotion of the interests of a volunteer organization to which the opera-
tor and rider both belong. Secondly, it impliedly raises the matter of the
appropriate relationship when the operator and rider are participating in
a common purpose, social or business, and they share the costs and expenses
of the trip. Finally, it requires us to briefly look at the applicability
of aviation guest laws when the pilot and the rider are engaged in a joint
venture. For the lack of more adequate terminology, it is submitted that
cases failling into these three aspects can and should be generically char-
acterized as "mutual benefit" cases.
The first two classes of "mutual benefit" cases create the greatest lack
of agreement from one aviation guest law jurisdiction to the next. Where
the trip confers a benefit upon a voluntary organization to which both
the operator and rider belong, appears from the Cox case, that such a
benefit is not a sufficient "payment" for the flight. However, California
has taken a more liberal position. In Malloy v. Fong" the California
Supreme Court held that there was a sufficient benefit where both the driver
and the rider were members of the same church, which was to benefit
o Supra note 157.
"' Id. at Av. Cas. 17,432.
37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951).
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from the trip. Likewise, it was earlier held that where the driver and
plaintiff were engaged in a volunteer effort to promote the interests of a
boy scout troop, and both persons were directly interested in the status
of the troop, there was a sufficient "benefit" to warrant plaintiff being a
passenger.'93 There is a hybrid case in Illinois that in part involves volun-
tary action by plaintiff-rider in pursuit of a mutual benefit. In Perrine v.
Charles T. Bisch & Son"' the court found a sufficient benefit where the
rider accompanied her husband in the defendant's ambulance so as to assist
in his care during the ride to the hospital. The plaintiff received no compen-
sation; to the contrary, her purpose was to benefit her husband. The de-
fendant's purpose was to benefit the husband and to realize gross revenue
in exchange.
The second class of "mutual benefit" cases involves sharing of the ex-
penses of operating the aircraft. Here we will have to look primarly to
automobile guest cases for guidance. This issue has been the subject of
substantial litigation.'" In general, the outcome will turn upon whether
the primary purpose of the trip or ride is social or business. Where the
primary purpose is of a social or friendly nature, the plaintiff has a greater
burden. Where there was an agreement prior to the trip,9' and particularly
where the driver refused to commence the journey unless the rider shared
the expenses,19 ' the plaintiffs have generally prevailed. When there is such an
expressed agreement the quantum of the rider's contribution is less criti-
cal.19 On the other hand, where sociality is the primary purpose and
there is no prior agreement, then the rider's contribution must be sub-
stantial in relation to the total cost of the trip." Payment of mere inci-
dental expenses will not suffice;200 nor will payment of the rider's pro-rata
share of the costs."' When the purpose is purely of a business or com-
mercial nature, but not a "joint venture," and both the operator and the
rider stand to benefit from the ride, the plaintiff merely needs to show some
contribution to the expenses of the trip."'
9
'Woodman v. Hemet Union High School Dist., 136 Cal. App. 544, 29 P.2d 257 (1934);
Vest v. Kramer, 158 Ohio St. 78, 107 N.E.2d 105 (1952).
194 346 Ill. App. 321, 105 N.E.2d 542 (1952).
95See Annotation, Share-the-ride Arrangements or Car Pool As Affecting Status of Automobile
Rider as Guest, 10 A.L.R.3d 1087 (1966).
'"Whitmore v. French, 37 Cal. 2d 744, 235 P.2d 3 (1951); Marks v. Newburger, 69 Ill.
App. 2d 220, 216 N.E.2d 250 (1966); Kempin v. Mardis, 123 Ind. App. 546, 111 N.E.2d 77
(1953); Shumaker v. Kline, 333 Mich. 346, 53 N.W.2d 295 (1952); Elfers v. Bright, 108 Ohio
App. 495, 162 N.E.2d 535 (1938); Beer v. Beer, 52 Ohio App. 276, 3 N.E.2d 702 (1935); see
Georgetta, The Motor Issue in a Guest Case, INS. L.J. 583, 586 (1954).
19. Corey v. Nelson, 361 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1966) (applying California law); Boyd v. Alguire,
153 N.W.2d 192 (S.D. 1967); McMahon v. De Kraay, 70 S.D. 180, 16 N.W.2d 308 (1944).
.
99 Burrow v. Porterfield, 171 Ohio St. 28, 168 N.E.2d 137 (1960).
'"Allison v. Ely, 159 N.E.2d 717 (Ind. App. 1959); Burrow, supra note 197; Duncan v.
Hutchinson, 139 Ohio St. 185, 39 N.E.2d 140 (1942).
"'Knuckles v. Elliott, - Ind. App. -, 227 N.E.2d 179 (1967); Ledford v. Klein, 87
N.W.2d 345 (N.D. 1957); Greenhalgh v. Green, 16 Utah 2d 221, 398 P.2d 691 (1965); see
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) TORTS, § 490, comment a; see also Notes, The Indiana Guest Statute, 34
IND. L.J. 338, 341 (1958-59).
"'tRogers v. Vreeland, 16 Cal. App. 2d 364, 60 P.2d 585 (1936).
.. Gillespie v. Rawlings, 49 Cal. 2d 359, 317 P.2d 601 (1957); Davis v. Woodcock, 101 Cal.
App. 2d 618, 225 P.2d 918 (1951); Pence v. Deaton, 354 Mich. 547, 93 N.W.2d 246 (1958);
Schmidt v. Robinet, 2 Mich. App. 45, 138 N.W.2d 563 (1966); Angel v. Constable, 40 Ohio Abs.
1, 57 N.E.2d 86 (1943); Marsh v. Irvine, 22 Utah 2d 154, 449 P.2d 996 (1969); see Annotation,
[Vol. 3 6
AVIATION GUEST LAWS
As too often occurs, there may be social and business purposes behind
a particular flight. There, one must look at the chief or most influential
purpose before making his analysis of what contribution to the expenses
of the trip will be a sufficient payment or compensation. 03 However, where
the operator is on a business purpose, and the rider is merely a social com-
panion, unrelated to the business activity, the guest status prevails.' It
should be noted that North Dakota expressly prohibits the sharing of
expenses from being a sufficient benefit. There is no differentiation between
social and business "rides."
The third class of "mutual benefit" cases involve an operator and rider
who are involved in a "joint venture." Where there exists such a thorough
going business relationship between the operator or owner and the rider,
and the particular flight is in pursuit of the affairs of the "joint venture,"
clearly the ride does not involve a gratuity. Hence, the aviation guest
statute would be inapplicable.' ° The elements of a true joint venture are:
1. an agreement, express or implied, among the members of the group;
2. a common purpose to be carried out by the group;
3. a community of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the mem-
bers; and,
4. an equal right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise, which gives
an equal right to control."'
The existence of a mere common purpose will not be enough."°
However, since some jurisdictions deny recovery to one joint venturer
and not to another, the plaintiffs should realize that for purposes of cir-
cumventing the aviation guest statute, it will be sufficient if they show
only the first three elements of a joint venture, without showing any right
to control the aircraft or the course of flight."'
In summary, the following factors are to be analyzed before reaching a
definite conclusion regarding the existence of a sufficient "payment" or
"compensation" so as to preclude application of the various aviation guest
laws :"
1. existence of an express agreement between the rider or someone on his
behalf and the pilot or aircraft owner or someone on their behalf;
2. receipt of any tangible benefit at any time, by the pilot or owner or
someone in their behalf, from the rider or someone in his behalf, which is
related to the purpose of the flight;
3. the motivational influences affecting the pilot's decision to take the
rider along on the flight;
Mutual Business or Commercial Objects or Benefits as Affecting Status of Rider Under Automobile
Guest Statutes, 59 A.L.R.2d 336 (1958).203Halbert v. Berlinger, supra note 157; Smith v. Franklin, 14 Utah 2d 16, 376 P.2d 541
(1962); see Note, HOUSTON L. REv. 690, 694 (1967).
20 Jennings v. Hodges, 129 N.W.2d 59 (S.D. 1964).
203Elisalda v. Welch's Sand & Gravel Co., 260 Cal. App. 2d 46, 67 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1968); Mu-
kasey v. Aaron, 20 Utah 2d 383, 438 P.2d 702 (1968); De Lacy, Trials Under the Guest Statute,
15 NEB. L. BULL. 306, 309 (1936-37).
O Mukasey, supra note 205, at P.2d 704; see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) TORTS, § 491.
.. See Note, The Ohio Guest Statute, 10 U. CN. L. REv. 289, 297 (1936).
205Walker v. Adamson, 9 Cal. 2d 287, 70 P.2d 914 (1937); and see 1 A PERSONAL INJURY-
ACTIONS-DEPENSES--DAMAGES, S 1.11(5)(d), at 283 (1968).
'°'See Note, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 174, 178 (1967).
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4. the social and business aspects of the purposes for the flight;
5. the existence of a mutual benefit to be enjoyed by a common third
party or between the pilot or owner and the rider themselves; and,
6. the previous relationship between the pilot or owner and the rider.
Assuming the due creation of the host-guest relationship, it, like most
things, has a beginning and an ending.
E. Beginning and Ending of Host-Guest Relationship
Assuming that there is in fact a host-guest relationship, one must deter-
mine whether it was legally effective at the time of the accident. Since
each guest statute is couched in such terms as "the ride" or "the transporta-
tion," we must injuire into what constitutes the beginning of the rider or
transportation. Initially, the specific provisions of the applicable statute
must be carefully examined. In terms of when the trip commences, the
sixteen statutes can be roughly divided into two categories. The first de-
fines the duration of the host-guest relationship in terms of the riders'
physical relationship to the aircraft. California, Illinois, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Mexico and Utah require that the rider be "in" the aircraft. Cali-
fornia uses the phrase "in or upon any aircraft." The second group defines
the relationship in terms of the activity of "riding" or transporting."
States in this group are Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, North Dakota,
Oregon, South Carolina and South Dakota. Arkansas tends to combine
these two groups by using the language "transported ... in aircraft. .. ."
As with other particular portions of these statutes, this type of analysis may
be critical to the outcome of the litigation, for one must always remember
that all aviation guest statute states, except South Dakota, construe thtse
statutes narrowly and in favor of he rider.
The "ride" or "transportation" begins, at the very earliest, when the
rider actually commences the process of leaving the ground and attempt-
ing to enter the aircraft. Such an interpretation has been followed in
Illinois and Uah in regard to automobiles."'0 In Tallios v. Tallios,2" the
Illinois court reasoned that if the ride did not begin until the rider was
seated in the vehicle, the purpose for the guest statute would be defeated
or impaired.
Although the operative language in the Illinois automobile guest statute;
i.e., "in or upon," was virtually identical to that in the California and
Ohio statutes, the latter two states reached much less restrictive definitions
of when he ride begins. California has taken a very liberal view. The
relationship does not begin until the rider actually enters the vehicle."
Clearly it does not apply while the rider is standing outside the vehicle.1 3
210 Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 103 11. App. 2d 469, 243 N.E.2d 616, 621 (1968); Tallios v. Tallios,
350 Ill. App. 299, 112 N.E.2d 723, 725 (1953); Andrus v. Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 404 P.2d 972
(1965); see Comment, 2 S.D. L. REV. 98, 101 (1957).
211 Supra note 210.21 Trigg v. Smith, 246 Cal. App. 2d 510, 54 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1966); see Note, 16 TEX. L.
REV. 590 (1937-38).
"'Boyd v. Cress, 46 Cal. 2d 164, 293 P.2d 37 (1956); see Annotation, Liability, Under Guest
Statutes, of Driver or Owner of Motor Vehicle for Running Over or Hitting Person Attempting to
Enter the Vehicle, I A.L.R.3d 1083 (1965).
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Going one step further, in California the ride has not begun even though
the rider has one foot on the vehicle and the other on the ground."
It seems relatively clear that Ohio follows the liberal California view.
In Economou v. Anderson,"' the court held that the rider was not being
transported in or upon the vehicle when the plaintiff received injuries dur-
ing the process of entering the vehicle. Further, in Lewis v. Woodland, 6 the
rider had entered and was injured while closing the door. The court held
that the injury was in no way related to the operation of the vehicle. Hence,
the guest statute did not apply. Michigan apparently sides with California
and Ohio.1
Once the relationship of host and guest is created and the ride or trans-
portation begins, when does the relationship terminate ?21 Generally, there
are two facets to this question: first, when does the relationship terminate
because the "ride" or "transportation" has ended? and Secondly, when,
if ever, does the relationship terminate because of the operator's conduct,
although the ride continues?
As to when the ride terminates, there is some unanimity in the aviation
guest law jurisdictions. California, Illinois, Nebraska and Utah take the
position that the ride, and necessarily the relationship, terminates when
the rider has safely alighted. 1 ' In Kolar v. Divis,'" the Nebraska Supreme
Court extended the life of the host-guest relationship beyond the physical
act of contact with the ground. There the rider drowned a few seconds
after alighting from the vehicle. The automobile guest statute was applied.
There was no evidenceof any misconduct by the driver after the rider had
vacated the vehicle. Clearly, the host cannot hang onto the guest statute
shield for protection once the rider has alighted and his subsequent mis-
conduct causes injury to or death of the rider.2 '
One aspect of this first issue has created diversity among jurisdictions
-whether or not the relationship terminates during a stop or interrup-
tion in the ride. California' and Ohio" have squarely held that the
host-guest relationship terminates during any temporary stop or inter-
ruption in the ride so long as the rider is outside the vehicle. The relation-
ship does not resume until the rider once again re-enters tht vthicle. How-
ever, where the operator momentarily vacates the vehicle, but retains the
right of control, the relationship does not automatically terminate.' Illinois
" 
4 Elisalda, supra note 205; Smith v. Pope, 53 Cal. App. 2d 43, 127 P.2d 292 (1942).
2154 Ohio App. 2d 1, 211 N.E.2d 82 (1965).
"6 101 Ohio App. 442, 140 N.E.2d 322 (1955).2"*Hunter v. Baldwin, 268 Mich. 106, 255 N.W. 431 (1934).
See Annotation, Commencement and Termination of Host and Guest Relationship Within
Statute or Rule as to Liability for Injury to Automobile Guest, 146 A.L.R. 682 (1943).
219 Trigg, supra note 212; Todd v. Borowski, 25 111. App. 2d 367, 166 N.E.2d 296, 302 (1960);
Tallios, supra note 210; Kolar v. Divis, 179 Neb. 756, 140 N.W.2d 658 (1966); Andrus, supra
note 210.
229 Supra note 219.
22' Tubbs v. Argus, 140 Ind. App. 695, 225 N.E.2d 841 (1967); see Annotation, Liability of
Vehicle Driver or Owner for Running Over or Hitting Former Passenger or Guest Who Has
Alighted, 50 A.L.R.2d 974 (1956).
222 Campbell v. Adams, 250 Cal. App. 2d 756, 59 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1967); Trigg, supra note 212.
221 Clinger v. Duncan, 166 Ohio St. 216, 141 N.E.2d 156 (1957).
22 Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal. 2d 337, 303 P.2d 738 (1956).
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and Utah takes a more restrictive position. In Todd v. Borowski," the
Illinois court held:
The phraseology 'operating his automobile' is not necessarily limited only to a
state of physical motion produced by the mechanism of the car, but it in-
cludes at least ordinary stops in, on and about the highway, and those are to
be regarded as fairly incidental to the operating thereof.
However, in Radolph v. Webb,226 the same court refused to apply tht
guest statute to a guest who had alighted for the purpose of putting money
in a parking meter and where it was not certain that the guest was going
to return to the vehicle later. Hence, in Illinois one must look to the pur-
pose of the stop or interruption before it can be determined whether the
ride has temporarily terminated."'7 Utah adheres to the rule that the "ride"
includes any incidents which happen in the course of and arising out of
the transportation.'
Another very interesting and related question, which has arisen in guest
law litigation, is whether a host-passenger relationship can be terminated
when the primary purpose of the "ride" changes from business to social.
In Lyon v. City of Long Beach," a California court held that although
the operator received a sufficient benefit from the rider in regard to the
ride from his home to the site of their common employment, there was no
Itcompensation" for an immediately subsequent side-trip to get some
coffee. Hence, the purpose of the total ride changed from business to social
and the rider's status changed from "passenger" to "guest" prior to the
accident. The precedential value of the Lyon case was somewhat under-
mined in Halbert v. BerlingerY' There the crash occurred during a side-
trip and after the business goal had been accomplished. The court reasoned
that the side-trip to do some hunting was part and parcel of the operator's
effort to get the rider to employ his company to do a proposed construction
job. Hence, the defendant's argument that the rider had become a "guest"
prior to the accident was rejected. A similar result was reached by the
Oregon Supreme Court in De Foor v. Lematta,2' but the issue was not
discussed.
The second aspect of termination of the host-guest relationship is more
intricate an dmore difficult to prove; i.e., has the operator's conduct resulted
in termination of the relationship although the ride continues?...
The rule was clearly stated by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Ander-
son v. Williams:22
225 Supra note 219.
22644 1l1 App, 2d 118, 194 N.E.2d 379 (1963).
212 Flodberg v. Whitcomb, 79 111. App. 2d 320, 224 N.E.2d 606 (1967).
228Andrus, supra note 210.
22992 Cal. App. 2d 472, 207 P.2d 73 (1949).
220 Supra note 157.
231 Id.
22 See Fribourg, Guest-Host Relation Termination After Beginning of Journey, 5 CLEVE-MAR.
L. REV. 101 (1956); Annotation, Protest By Guest Against Driver's Manner of Operation of
Motor Vehicle as Terminating Host-Guest Relationship, 25 A.L.R.2d 1448 (1952).
23395 Ga. App. 684, 98 S.E.2d 579, 581 (1957); see also Blanchard v. Ogletree, 41 Ga. App.
4, 152 S.E. 116 (1929).
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The plaintiff, although originally a guest to whom the driver owed only the
duty of slight care, brought about what amounted to a change in the legal
relationship of the parties by reason of her request to be permitted to leave
the car. . . . [By] Anderson's refusal to allow her to do so, and [since she
was a] passenger therein against her will, the defendant Anderson owed her
the duty to exercise ordinary care in her behalf.
California,' Ohio," and Oregon" follow the Georgia rule. However,
in Oregon there must be a showing that the acceptance of the gratuitous
transportation has been rescinded. To do so there must be more than a
protest by the rider to the operator. The operator must clearly refuse to
acceded to the guest's demand. In Stiltner, the Ohio court introduced a
further required showing of the operator's state of mind:
• . . [A] guest . . . does not cease to be a guest . . . as long as the driver of
the vehicle reasonably intends to give hospitality that will benefit his rider,
especially where the hospitality is the same that the rider expected to receive
on entering the vehicle-in this case a ride to the driver's home. 7
Washington, a non-aviation guest law jurisdiction, illustrates the dia-
metrically opposing view.' There "once a guest-host relation is established,
subsequent demands by the plaintiff (rider) to be let out of the car do
not terminate the relation." [Emphasis added.].' The rule has been
strongly criticized:
The guest-host relationship is established on the tenuous thread of a mutual
social benefit. No authority can be found to state that the host may not
terminate the relation at will, for the plain reason that the relation arose the
same way. To hold that a guest may be denied the power to terminate, while
the host retains such power, is to give the relation a construction incompatible
with its meaning."
It would seem that the position to be taken by those aviation guest
statute jurisdictions that have yet to commit themselves on this question
would logically depend upon the particular philosophy of the nature of
the relationship adopted in that state. If the jurisdiction adheres to the
consensual theory of the creation of the relationship, then it would follow
that the host-guest relation should be equally terminable upon rescission
of that consent.
Before concluding our discussion of the status of the rider, note should
be taken of certain miscellaneous cases that could have direct application
to certain aviation activity.
F. Miscellaneous
In Langford v. Rogers. 1 and Vest v. Kramer,' the Michigan and Ohio
234Barr v. Carroll, 128 Cal. App. 2d 23, 274 P.2d 717 (1954).
23 Stiltner v. Bahner, 10 Ohio St. 2d 216, 227 N.E.2d 192, 196 (1967); Redis v. Lynch, 169
Ohio St. 305, 159 N.E.2d.597, 599 (1959).
23 Senechal v. Bauman, 232 Ore. 217, 375 P.2d 60, 62 (1962).237 Supra note 235, at N.E42d 197.
... Tyalor v. Taug, 17 Wash. 2d 533, 136 P.2d 176 (1943);
' Fribourg, supra note 232, at 105.
240Id. at 108.
24' 278 Mich. 310, 270 N.W. 692 (1936).
242 158 Ohio St. 78, 107 N.E.2d 105 (1952).
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Supreme Courts, respectively, were faced with the issue of whether the
automobile guest statute of their state applied to a vehicle that was being
towed by the operator. The Michigan court held that the statute applied
to riders on a sled being towed behind the defendant's car. Similarly, the
Ohio court ruled that the statute applied to riders in a trailor being towed
behind the operator's automobile. Query, would the various aviation
guest laws apply to riders in a glider while it was being towed to altitude
by the defendant's aircraft? In Michigan and Ohio, the answer would
appear to be in the affirmative.
Another curious anomaly of aviation guest law occurred when two
commonly aircraft crashed after a midair collision over Norwalk, Cali-
fornia.' Each aircraft was owned by the Unived States government. The
defendant raised the California aviation guest statute as a bar to the plain-
tiff's recovery. In the court's opinion it was unnecessary to consider the
issue, because as to the pilot of the other aircraft there clearly was no host-
guest relationship with the plaintiff's decedent. Therefore, the statute would
not apply to that pilot and thus not to his employer, the United States.
Hence, it would appear that where the accident involves a collision between
two aircraft owned by the same defendant, that the aviation guest statute
would not apply.
These three cases could result in non-application of an aviation guest
law where the defendant's glider referred to above is hit by the defendant's
tow-plane after the line is released. A very curious thing indeed are these
guest laws!
We have now come to the most troublesome aspect of guest law litiga-
tion. Has the plaintiff shown sufficient misconduct by the defendant so as to
satisfy the applicable diminished standard of care?
V. DIMINISHED STANDARDS OF CARE OWED BY HOSTS TO GUESTS
A. Introduction
All aviation guest laws in the United States provide certain exceptions
to their applicability. While they all preclude imposition of liability on
the basis of simple negligence, they do allow recovery of the guest or his
heirs if the host was guilty of aggravated misconduct. Thus, each law
diminishes the standard of care owed by a host to a guest in varying de-
grees. Among the seventeen American jurisdictions that clearly adhere to
aviation guest laws, there is great variation in the language used to describe
these reduced standards. Herein we will try to untangle this semantic mess.
Below is a listing of the diminished standards and the states wherein
they are applied:
Standard States
1. Gross Negligence Georgia, Idaho, Michigan, Nebraska,
2. Heedlessness or Reckless Disregard Nevada, North Dakota and Oregon
of the Rights of Others New Mexico and South Carolina
'
4 Moore v. U.S., 178 F. Supp. 264 (N.D. Ala. 1959).
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3. Wilful and Wanton Disregard of Arkansas and Delaware
the Rights of Others
4. Wilful and/or Wanton Miscon- Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, North
duct Dakota, Ohio and South Dakota
5. Wilful Misconduct California, Nevada and Utah
6. Intentional Delaware, New Mexico, Oregon and
South Carolina
7. Intoxication or Under the Influ- California, Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada,
ence of Intoxicating Liquor North Dakota, Oregon and Utah
As with the question of status, the guest has the burden of proving that
the host was guilty of the applicable diminished standard of care.' Like
status, the existence of the aggravated misconduct is usually a question of
fact to be resolved by the trier of fact.' Further, it should be carefully
noted that the doctrine of res ipsa locquitur is not available to plaintiffs
in meeting this burden in a guest case.'
After fifty-three years of judicial experience with these varying concepts
of reduced civil fault, there is great uncertainty as to their meaning.
Professors Harper and James describe the situation in these harsh terms:
Disagreement and confusion have marked judicial attempts to define these
terms, even within a single jurisdiction. Often they add nothing helpful to
the language of the statute itself. The problem of putting a rule into words
is even greater if states with similar statutes are taken together. 7
Hence, it is close to impossible to device any formulation of the definitions
that will be functional in any given factual situation. "
Whereas automobile guest cases were helpful in defining "status," they
are of little assistance in trying to analyze specific aviation guest cases so
as to determine the presence of one or more of the aggravated acts of
wrongful doing that will satisfy the applicable guest statute. It is axiomatic
in tort law that whatever the standard of care to be applied, it still must
be adapted to the framework and context of the specific human activity.
Little empirical analysis need be done for one to realize that aircraft opera-
tion varies greatly from automobile travel. This factual differentiation has
been judicially recognized:
We take judicial notice of the difference between air traffic and travel by
rail, highway, and canal. The speed, the variable three-dimensional move-
ment of the aircraft in flight, the complexity of instrumentation and controls,
the necessity for constant vigilance, and the ever-present threat of disaster
in case of accident all require higher skills, greater precautions, and heavier
2"Guyton v. Guyton, 244 S.C. 357, 137 S.E.2d 273 (1964). The California statute expressly
imposes that burden on plaintiff. See Appendix.
2's Goncalves v. Los Banos Mining Co., 58 Cal. 2d 916, 376 P.2d 833 (1962); Fisher v. Zimmer-
man, 23 Cal. App. 2d 696, - P.2d - (1937); Todd, supra note 219.
246 Phillips v. Noble, 50 Cal. 2d 163, - P.2d - (1958); Lincoln v. Quick, 133 Cal. App.
433, - P. - (1933); Garland v. Greenspan, 74 Nev. 89, 323 P.2d 27 (1958); Nyberg v.
Kirby, 65 Nev. 50, 188 P.2d 1006 (1948); see Comment, 8 DRAxE L. REv. 128, 133 (1958).
4" 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 952 (1956); see also Comment, The Ohio Guest
Statute, 22 Ohio St. L.J. 629, 630 (1961).248Emons v. Shiraef, 359 Mich. 526, 102 N.W.2d 490 (1960); Garrett v. Howden, 73 N.M.
307, 387 P.2d 874, 878 (1963).
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responsibilities to constitute due care in the operation of aircraft than in the
operation of land or water vehicles."
The impact of this technological difference upon guest law litigation was
well expressed by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Walthrew v. Davis:
• . .there are obvious and marked differences between transportation by auto-
mobile and by airplane and the hazards and risks incident to each. What
would be slight negligence in the operation of an automobile might be gross
negligence with disasterous results in the operation of an airplane. A guest
displeased with and alarmed at his host's negligent operation of an automobile
may get out and take to the highway on foot. A guest in an airplane has no
such election, but must suffer the consequence of his host's negligence which
is frequently fatal. [Emphasis added.].
Hence, in regard to what in fact will or should constitute "gross negli-
gence," "reckless disregard," or "wilful or wanton misconduct" in aviation
guest cases will have to be left to future litigation. Until that time we
can start with the general definitions that now prevail and with the few
reported aviation cases that have dealt with these concepts. Further, there
are certain automobile guest cases that suggest analogous rules applicable
to aviation.
B. "Gross Negligence"
The judicial concept of "gross negligence" has had a long and inglorious
history in the United States." Our courts have had great difficulty in de-
fining the meaning of "gross negligence" in terms of specific factual
situations." 2
There are certain basic propositions that are generally adopted. First,
gross negligence involves a degree of culpability that exceeds ordinary or
simple negligence at one end of the spectrum and wilful misconduct at
the other."5 Gross negligence and wilful misconduct are said to be "differ-
ent in kind and the words descriptive of one commonly exclude the
other."'
As pointed out earlier, in 1917 Massachusetts was the first American
jurisdiction to adopt a diminished standard of care owed by a host to a
gratuitous rider in an automobile. That standard was one of "gross negli-
gence." In 1919 the Supreme Court of that state presented us with one of
the earliest attempts at defining this chameleon-like concept:"
Gross negligence is substantially and appreciably higher in magnitude than
ordinary negligence .... It is very great negligence, or the absence of slight
diligence, or the want of even scant care. It amounts to indifference to present
legal duty and to utter forgetfulness of legal obligations so far as other persons
may be affected....
249 Lange v. Nelson-Ryan Flight Service, Inc., 259 Minn. 460, 108 N.W.2d 428, 432-33 (1961).
250201 Va. 557, 111 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1960).
25 See 74 A.L.R. 1198 (1931); 86 A.L.R. 1145 (1933); 91 A.L.R. 554 (1934); 96 A.L.R.
1479 (1935); 136 A.L.R. 1256 (1942); 21 A.L.R.2d 209 (1952); 6 A.L.R.3d 769 (1966).25 2 See Note, 34 U. DET. L.J. 169, 170 (1956); Georgetta, supra note 196, at 589-90.
"' Walker v. Moser, 201 So.2d 609 (Fla. App. 1967); Ledford v. Klein, 87 N.W.2d 345 (N.D.
1957).
254 Ledford, supra note 253, at 352.
25" Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 121 N.E. 505, 506 (1919).
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Arkansas, '  California,' Georgia, "  Nebraska,"' and Nevada" have
agreed with this early definition.
As one would imagine this simplistic approach did not last. "Appreciably
higher," very great," "absence of slight diligence" and "want of even
scant care" did not resolve the problem. Their meaning in concrete terms
remained equally nebulous. It did not take the courts long to realize this
semantical snake-pit. They began to add a new element to the concept.
North Dakota equated gross negligence with an utter indifference on the
part of the host to the consequences of his wrongful act."6 ' [Emphasis
added.] Idaho, 2' Nebraska'e and Oregon' converted indifference to
the consequences into an indifference to or reckless disregard for the safety
of the guests in the vehicle. Oregon went so far as to include a definition
of gross negligence in its guest statute which applies to automobiles, air-
craft and watercraft:
Gross negligence . . . is characterized by conscious indifference to or reckless
disregard of the rights of others.'
Needless to say, reliance upon "reckless disregard" has not solved the
problem either. What constitutes "reckless disregard"? Both Idaho" s and
Oregon'. turned to the Restatement of Torts, Second, for a definition.
Section 500 attempts to define "reckless disregard" in these terms:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he
does not act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the
other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a
reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable
risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially
greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
As we will see below, this definition comes very close to the concept of
the wilful and/or wanton misconduct doctrines applied in Arkansas,
California, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota,
Ohio, South Dakota and Utah. In fact, South Dakota " and Michigan...
have expressly equated "gross negligence" with "wilful and wanton mis-
conduct." However, such equating is not the majority rule."'
"
5 Spence v. Vaught, 236 Ark. 509, 367 S.W.2d 238, 240 (1963).
"7 Kastel v. Stieber, 215 Cal. 362, - P. - (1932). As originally enacted in 1929, the
automobile guest statute contained gross negligence. It was deleted by amendment in 1931.
"
5 Sammons v. Webb, 86 Ga. App. 382, 71 S.E.2d 832 (1952).
25Brugh v. Peterson, 183 Neb. 190, 159 N.W.2d 321 (1968); see Spikes, Gross Negligence
Under the Guest Statute, 22 NEB. L. REv. 264 (1943).
... Stiff v. Holmes, 450 P.2d 153 (Nev. 1969).
.6 Jacobs v. Nelson, 67 N.D. 30, 268 N.W. 873 (1936).
... Peterson v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647, 448 P.2d 653, 662-63 (1968).
2°Brugh, supra note 259; Mierendorf v. Saalfeld, 295 N.W. 901 (Nev. 1941); Larson v.
Storm, 289 N.W. 792 (1940).
14 Williamson v. McKenna, 223 Ore. 366, 354 P.2d 56, 68 (1960); Turner v. McCready, 190
Ore. 28, 222 P.2d 1010, 1018 (1950).
" See Appendix.
266 Peterson, supra note 262.
.67 Williamson, supra note 264.
218 Minick v. Englert, 167 N.W.2d 552 (S.D. 1969); Granflaten v. Rohde, 283 N.W. 153
(S.D. 1938); Melby v. Anderson, 64 S.D. 249, 266 N.W. 135 (1936).
26 9 Bobich v. Rogers, 258 Mich. 343, 241 N.W. 854 (1934).
21 Comment, 24 IowA L. REV. 765 (1939).
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It should be noted that, historically, we have moved toward a definition
that emphasizes the potential consequences of the host's wrongdoing. The
courts have become concerned to a lesser extent with the subjective quality
of acts per se. This shift in emphasis is very important to the application
of the concept of gross negligence to aviation accident litigation. Because
of the greater speed, momentum and mobility of aircraft, as compared to
automobiles, the consequences of wrongdoing can be much greater. What
would be a "fender-bender" in the collision of two automobiles would be
human disaster between two aircraft. Operating an automobile in condi-
tions of poor visibility may simply mean a slower velocity. In an aircraft
without an instrument-trained pilot, it would probably mean vertigo or
spatial disorientation resulting in a graveyard spiral or other loss of control.
Finally, defining gross negligence in terms of reckless disregard of the
safety of others introduces into the litigation the subjective element of the
state of mind of the pilot. This is clearly the impact of the phrase "know-
ing or having reason to know" found in Section 500 of the restatement
quoted above. Below, we will examine this aspect of guest law litigation
in terms of this and the other diminished standards of care under the
statutes.
What constitutes gross negligence in the operation of aircraft has been
litigated to a certain extent. 7' In the Huguley case, the question of what
constitutes gross negligence came up in the context of an attack upon the
pleadings. The court ruled that the allegation that the pilot, who was not
trained to fly by reference to cockpit instruments, failed to keep a proper
lookout ahead in order to avoid terrain obstructions, was sufficient to raise
the issue of gross negligence for the jury. In dicta the court indicated that
it may have been gross negligence for a non-instrument rated pilot to have
even attempted a take-off where by slight diligence the pilot could have
learned that adverse weather conditions would have prevented visual flight
rules27 operations. In essence, the existence of such climatic conditions in
such a situation would preclude any possibility of maintaining a look-
out. The court sustained the allegations of gross negligence.
The question of what constitutes gross negligence was again litigated in
a procedural context in Drahmann v. Brink."' A motion for a directed
verdict in favor of the defendant was granted by the trial court. Hence,
the question before the court was whether the plaintiff had presented suffic-
ient evidence of gross negligence to require submission of that issue to the
jury. The Kentucky appellate court, applying Georgia law, held that the
issue should have gone to the jury. The evidence indicated the following
errors by the pilot, all in violation of then existing regulations:
1. final approach at too high an altitude and too great a speed to permit
a landing;
... Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Huguley, 100 Ga. App. 75, 110 S.E.2d 63 (1959);
Drahmann v. Brink, 290 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. Civ. App. 1956) (applying Georgia law); Sammons,
supra note 258; Steinbock v. Schiewe, 330 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1964) (applying Oregon law).
2





2. during the overshoot procedure, leaving the aircraft's flaps and landing
gear in the down position;
3. failing to execute the proper procedure for the go-round on the second
landing approach;
4. attempting the second landing partially down-wind and partially cross-
wind, when he could have landed into the wind;
5. attempting a mid-field landing; and,
6. failing to apply additional power to or adjust the pitch of his propeller
during the second attempted go-round.
As a result of all these errors, the aircraft stalled and crashed during the
second attempted go-round.
Sammons v. Webb"74 is another case applying Georgia law and involving
errors in aircraft operations. A jury returned a verdict for plaintiff on the
issue of gross negligence and the defendant appealed from the resulting
judgment, which was affirmed. The court ruled that the following evidence
warranted submission of the issue of gross negligence to the jury:
1. operation of the aircraft at dusk when visibility was poor, thus pre-
venting the pilot from seeing a landing field some three or four miles from
the crash site;
2. the pilot attempted a landing on a roadway knowing that there were
guy wires supporting power line poles along the road;
3. the aircraft was functioning properly and had sufficient fuel to fly to
the near-by airport; and,
4. the pilot had the smell of alcohol on his breath just after the crash.
In passing it should be noted that in an automobile case it was held that
being under the influence of intoxicating liquor would not alone be suffici-
ent to show gross negligence, 75 although it may be one element. The rela-
tionship of alcohol consumption to diminished standards of care under avia-
tion guest statutes will be dealt with below. But, in the nine jurisdictions
that do not expressly except such cases from the guest statute, it would seem
to be the better rule, given the different nature of automobile and aircraft
operations, that merely attempting to operate an aircraft while under he
influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs would be a sufficient showing of
gross negligence.
Our final case involving gross negligence in an aircraft accident is
Steinbock v. SchreiveY Jury verdicts were returned in favor of the plain-
tiffs-guests under the Oregon aviation guest statute. The appellate court
ruled that the gross negligence issue was properly submitted to the jury.
The crash occurred on take-off. At about seventy-five feet the engine
sputtered, and the aircraft lost power and crashed. The following items of
wrongdoing were supported by the evidence:
1. the pilot inadequately conducted the pre-flight check of the fuel tanks;
2. the pilot took off without adequate fuel in the left wing tank;




5 Montgomery v. Ross, 156 Neb. 875, 58 N.W.2d 340 (1953).27 6 Supra note 271.
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4. the pilot failed to properly handle the aircraft after loss of power so
as to glide back to the field.
In conclusion, the automobile guest case of In re Byrne's Estate,2 " sug-
gests an important analogy for aviation guest cases. There the court held
that the operator was guilty of gross negligence where he operated his
car knowing that it was in a defective condition, and that the defect was
not known to nor discoverable by the guest."
Now let us turn to one of the more curious and puzzling concepts of
diminished care found in aviation guest statutes; i.e., "heedlessness or
reckless disregard of the rights of others."
C. "Heedlessness or Reckless Disregard of the Rights of Others"
As indicated above, New Mexico and South Carolina except from their
aviation guests statutes any accidents caused by the "heedlessness or reck-
less disregard of the rights of others" on the part of the owner or operator.
The questions to be answered are:
1. Does this exception create two standards of care; i.e., one involving
heedlessness and the other involving reckless disregard for the rights of
others?
2. If only one diminished standard is involved, is it more akin to gross
negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct?
Early in the history of the South Carolina automobile guest statute, the
court was faced with the issue of what was its proper construction. Al-
though the state legislature used the word "or," the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that the exception created only one diminished standard of
care, not two. Hence, the exception should read "heedlessness and reck-
less disregard of the rights of others." ' The court reasoned that since
heedlessness had been held to be equal ° to carelessness or simple negligence,
and if it were held to be a separate and distinct exception to the guest
statute, the legislature woul dhave performed a useless and futile act
when it enacted the statute, as the host would remain liable to the guest
as he was at common-law. Therefore, it would appear that we are here
leading with only one exception to the New Mexico' and South Carolina
statutes. 2
The answer to the second question is not so easy. In Fulgbum v. Bleak-
ley" the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted a definition of "reckless
2'277 N.W. 74 (Neb. 1938).
278 For a more detailed discussion of this relationship between defects in the vehicle and dimin-
ished standards of care under great statutes, see Note, Mechanical Defects. Held to Fall Under the
Provisions of the Guest Statute," 2 S. CAL. L. REv. 149 (1957).
279 Cummings v. Tweed, 195 S.C. 173, 10 S.E.2d 322 (1940).
.. Fulghum v. Bleaklcy, 177 S.C. 286, 181 S.E. 30 (1935).
""In Gill v. Hayes, 188 Okla. 434, 108 P.2d 117 (1940) the Supreme Court reached the
same conclusion regarding the New Mexico automobile guest statute as South Carolina did in Cum-
mings.
as2 Both New Mexico and South Carolina had used the Connecticut automobile guest statute as
a model. It contained the identical language of exception and had been construed in the same
manner in Bordonaro v. Senk, 109 Conn. 428, 147 A. 136 (1929).
283Supra note 280, at S.E. 33.
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disregard of the rights of others" that had been given six years earlier by
the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Bordonaro v. Senk;'" to wit:
Act or conduct in reckless disregard of the rights of others is improper or
wrongful conduct, and constitutes wanton misconduct, evincing a reckless
indifference to consenquences to the life, or limb, or health, or reputation or
property rights of another.u [Emphasis supplied].
To be sure this has a familiar ring to it. One is reminded of the Oregon
statutory definition of gross negligence discussed above. However, con-
sideration of the case definitions under the New Mexico statute clearly
reveals that "heedlessness or (and) . . . reckless disregard of the rights of
others" is much more akin to "wilful and wanton misconduct" than "gross
negligence."
In Forsyth v. Joseph,"s' the New Mexico Court of Appeals pointed out
these interrelationships:
• . . the words 'heedlessness or a reckless disregard of the rights of others,'
have a rather well-defined meaning under our Guest Statute. This meaning
contemplates something other than and different from negligence, and con-
templates culpability arising from conduct which is motivated by a particular
state of mind. This particular state of mind is one of utter irresponsibility or
conscious abandonment of any consideration for the safety of guest passengers.
[Emphasis added.].
Finally, Carpenter v. Yates"l resolves any remaining doubt that we are
not dealing with "gross negligence." There the court ruled that the state
of mind of the host that the guest must show to recover under this excep-
tion is similar to that which the state must show to sustain a conviction for
involuntary manslaughter for death resulting from operation of an auto-
mobile.
At the risk of over simplification and with great trepidation in attempt-
ing to propose general rules in this tangled thicket, let us, as did the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Gill v. Hayes,' suggest that "heedlessness or
(and) reckless disregard" constitutes a degree of culpability approaching,
if not identical to, wilful and wanton misconduct.
D. "Wilful And Wanton Disregard Of The Rights Of Others," And
"Wilful And/Or Wanton Misconduct," And "Wilful Misconduct"
Eleven of the seventeen states that unequivocally adhere to aviation
guest laws have exceptions, which allow recovery by a guest, based on
either "wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of others," or "wilful
and/or wanton misconduct," or "wilful misconduct." The case law de-
2
84 Supra note 282, at A. 137.
285 In Fowler v. Franklin, 58 N.M. 254, 270 P.2d 389 (1954), the court held that heedlessness
and reckless disregard constituted wanton misconduct.286 80 N.M. 27, 450 P.2d 627, 629 (1968).
287 58 N.M. 513, 273 P.2d 373 (1954).
2 8 8 Supra note 281, at P.2d 120; see Sheets v. Stalcup, 13 N.E.2d 346 (Ind. Civ. App. 1938),
where the court equated "reckless disregard" with "wanton or wilful misconduct." See also Emery
v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, - P.2d - (1955), where the court held that wilful misconduct allega-
tions in the complaint under California's guest statute would suffice to raise the issue of reckless
disregard under the Idaho guest statute.
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fining these concepts is a semantical nightmare.' There are, however, some
common ideas running through these opinions.
It is generally agreed that the problem exists because, "[t]here is no
exact standard of measurement for determination of where negligence
ends and wilful and wanton misconduct begins, under the guest statute,
and each case must be decided on its own facts."'29 There is agreement that
the host must have manifested an intention to act wrongfully in the face
of known or knowable circumstances that would create a probability that
to so act would result in injury to the guest.2  However, one need not
show that the host intended to injure or kill the guest.2 Finally, it is gen-
erally agreed that mere inadvertance or thoughtlessness is not sufficient."
Beyond these few areas of general consensus lie fields of conflicting defini-
tions and irreconcilable applications to similar factual situations. Neither
time, space nor patience permits a thoroughgoing analysis.
In brief, our job is narrowed to the definition of three concepts. Of the
eleven jurisdictions referred to above, three-California, Nevada and Utah
-rely upon the doctrine of "wilful misconduct." The remaining eight
use varying combinations of the terms "wanton" and "wilful." Arkansas,
Delaware, Indiana, and Ohio use "or" to separate "wanton" from "wilful"
so as to modify either "disregard of the rights of others" or "misconduct."
On the other hand, Illinois, Michigan, North Dakota and South Dakota
rely upon "and" and thus provide that the "misconduct" must be "wilful
and wanton." The realistic impact of this subtle semantic distinction will
be demonstrated after we define "wilful misconduct."
One of the earliest attempts to give workable meaning to the concept
of "wilful misconduct" occurred in Meek v. Fowler,' where the California
Supreme Court stated two aspects:
Wilful misconduct implies at least the intentional doing of something either
with a knowledge that serious injury is a probable (as distinguished from a
possible) result, or the intentional doing of an act with a wanton or wreck-
less disregard of its possible result.
California has very recently reaffirmed its adherence to this highly abstract
definition.9  Twenty-five years after Meek, the Utah Supreme Court came
28gAppleman, Wilful and Wanton Conduct in Automobile Guest Cases, 13 IND. L.J. 131, 142
(1936-37).
290 Comment, 31 IOWA L. REv. 428, 429, n.3 (1946).
291 Chappell v. Palmer, 236 Cal. App. 2d 34, 45 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1965); Wright v. Sellers, 25
Cal. App. 2d 603, - P.2d - (1938); Rowe v. Frazer, 83 Ill. App. 2d 367, 227 N.E.2d 781
(1967); Storckman v. Keller, 237 N.E.2d 602 (Ind. Civ. App. 1968); Tien v. Barkel, 351 Mich.
276, 88 N.W.2d 552 (1958); Mitchell v. Brewer, 193 N.E.2d 304 (Ohio Civ. App. 1962); Wil-
liamson, supra note 264; Minick v. Englert, - S.D. __, 167 N.W.2d 551 (1969); Milligan v.
Harward, 11 Utah 2d 74, 355 P.2d 62 (1960); Mundt, The South Dakota Automobile Guest
Statute, 2 S.D. L. REv. 70, 71 (1957); Harper, Development in the Law of Torts in Indiana,
1940-1945, 21 IND. L.J. 447, 448 (1946); Comment, 24 IOWA L. REv. 765 (1939); Comment,
2 IDAHO L.J. 128, 132-33 (1932).
212 Wright, supra note 291; Ehresman v. Town of Loda, 25 Ill. App. 2d 259, 166 N.E.2d 295
(1960); Tighe v. Diamond, 80 N.E.2d 122 (Ohio 1948); Note, 19 IND. L.J. 145 (1944); Com-
ment, 2 IDAHO L.J. 128, 132 (1932).
... DeFalla v. Tuttle, 132 Cal. App. 2d 473, 282 P.2d 513 (1955); Todd v. Borowski, 25 I11.
App. 2d 367, 166 N.E.2d 296 (1960).
2943 Cal. 2d 420, 45 P.2d 194, 197 (1935).
211 See Olson v. Clifton, 273 Adv. Cal. App. 391, 78 Cal. Rptr. 296, 299 (1969).
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forth with a slight modification, by adding to the definition, which appears
to be that which is in use currently. In Milligan v. Harvard2 the court
stated:
Wilful misconduct is the intentional doing of an act or intentional omitting
or failing to do an act, with knowledge that serious injury is a probable and
not merely a possible result, or the intentional doing of an act with wanton
and reckless disregard of the possible consequences. [Emphasis added so as to
indicate modification.]
There would appear to be room for one further improvement in this
definition: query, should a pilot be guilty of "wilful misconduct" for
intentionally omitting or failing to do an act with wanton and reckless
disregard of the possible consequences?
It has been suggested that the appropriate diminished standard of care
may depend upon whether the particular legislature inserted "or" as
compared to "and" between "wanton" and "wilful." 9 ' The rationale is that
where "or" is used the plaintiff need show either "wanton misconduct" or
"wilful misconduct," but not both. Hence, the plaintiff would normally
escape the clutches of the guest statute upon a showing of the less culpable
standard of care; i.e., wanton misconduct. On the other hand, if the legis-
lature placed "and" in its guest statute, the plaintiff would have to show
both "wanton misconduct" and "wilful misconduct," or more pragmatic-
ally, the plaintiff would be saddled with "wilful misconduct" in every case.
That writer's reasoning smacks of a logical and literal interpretation of the
statutes involved. It is indicative of the war of words that is guest law
litigation.
By comparing judicial definitions of these statutory provisions in "and"
states and in "or" states, it will be seen that the courts are far from imple-
menting this approach. Illinois and South Dakota each use "wilful and
wanton misconduct" in their automobile and aviation guest statutes."'
In Klatt v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 9' the Illinois Supreme Court de-
fined the exception thusly:
• .. the act must have been committed under circumstances exhibiting a reck-
less disregard for the safety of others, such as a failure after knowledge of
impending danger to exercise ordinary care to prevent it or a failure to dis-
cover the danger through recklessness or carelessness when it could have been
discovered by the exercise of ordinary care.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota has adopted a very similar definition
of its identical statutory phrase?
On the other hand, Indiana and Ohio use "or" to separate "wilful" and
"wanton" in their automobile and aviation guest statutes. In Storckman
v. Keller,"'t the appellate court of Indiana held that there were two ele-
2911 Utah 2d 74, 355 P.2d 62, 63 (1960).
297Note, The Indiana Guest Statute, 34 IND. L.J. 338 (1958).
29 See Appendix, and supra note 2.
29933 Ill. 2d 481, 211 N.E. 720, 724 (1965).
"g In Minick, supra note 291, at N.W.2d 554: "Willful and wanton misconduct may be con-
sidered as describing conduct of a driver when he does an act not conscious of the high degree
of manifest danger, but under the circumstances where he should have known."
30' 237 N.E.2d 602, 603-04 (Ind. App. 1968).
1970]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ments to "wanton or wilful misconduct:" (1) the driver must have had
knowledge of an impending danger or have been conscious of a course of
misconduct calculated to result in the probable injury to his guest; and
(2) his actions must have exhibited his indifference to the consequences of
his misconduct. Ohio has adopted a virtually identical definition for her
guest statute provision which is worded "wilful or wanton misconduct. ' "
Not only does the variation in "and/or" appear to make little difference
in judicial treatment of these provisions, but these definitions are some-
what similar to the concept of "wilful misconduct" discussed above.
As indicated above, the automobile and aviation guest statutes of Michi-
gan, Nevada and North Dakota all contain either the "wilful misconduct"
or "wilful and wanton misconduct" diminished standard of care. Each of
those jurisdictions also provides in the alternative that the operator will
be liable to his "guest" for his "gross negligence." When comparing the
definitions of these standards it is obvious that "gross negligence" involves
wrongdoing of a much lesser degree of culpability than does "wilful and
wanton misconduct" or "wilful misconduct." It is hard to conveive of
any factual situation that would support a finding of "wilful misconduct"
or "wilful and wanton misconduct" that would not clearly support "gross
negligence." The converse can be easily imagined. Hence, as a practical
matter, in each case the plaintiffs need go no further than a showing of
"gross negligence."
There are two reported aviation guest cases that deal with the issue of
what constitutes "wilfully and wantonly operated in disregard of the
rights of others" and "wilful misconduct. ' 's" In Ferrell v. Topp, ° the trial
court excluded testimony that before take-off the pilot had said that "if
the mountains were too high he would just make a hole in one of them."
The crash occurred when the aircraft struck a mountain en route. The
court of appeals reversed the judgment. It's rationale was:
In the case before us, we may assume that . . . [the pilot] had no intention
of crashing the plane against the mountain or to injure his own son or his
friend Ferrell. However, the evidence showed that immediately before the
flight was undertaken, ... [the pilot] was warned that the route he was
electing was dangerous. In spite of that he chose the most dangerous route
at a time when he knew he would be in dangerous territory after dark;
further, he learned that there were clouds and fog making the flight even
more dangerous. The evidence was that the clearance between the clouds
and the top of the mountains was such as to render it unsafe for airplane
traffic. It was further shown that ... [the pilot] was flying at an altitude
which was considered dangerous even in the daytime."
The court concluded that the evidence clearly demonstrated that the "air-
craft was wilfully and wantonly operated in disregard of the rights of the
guests. '
as Jenkins v. Sharp, 140 Ohio St. 80, 42 N.E.2d 755, 757 (1942).
"'
3Ferrell v. Topp, 386 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. 1964) (applying Arkansas law); and Lightenburger
v. Gordon, 81 Nev. 553, 407 P.2d 728 (1965).
304 Id.
8o5 Id.
... See the Arkansas aviation guest statute in the Appendix.
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The second case, Lightenburger v. Gordon,"°' involved application of the
California aviation guest statute by the Supreme Court of Nevada. The
crash occurred while on approach into Los Angeles International in mar-
ginal conditions. The defendant obtained a jury verdict and the plaintiffs
appealed. The supreme court reversed and stated:
Wanton reckless disregard could be found by the jury in these facts; as the
pilot descended he did so with the knowledge that there was a steadily de-
teriorating visibility at the airport and that visibility was already below the
Federal Aviation Agency minimums, that the Controller would terminate at
a point one-half mile from touchdown thereby cutting off communications
and guidance, that if he persisted in the approach he would be required to
attempt a visual contact and expose himself to disorientation and when
queried whether he intended making an approach in this weather he answered,
'Put me right down on the runway.'
There are a few automobile guest cases from states with comparable
aviation statutes that may provide strong analogies for diminished stand-
ards of care in aviation guest litigation. Two California cases, Morrison v.
Townly"' and Snider v. Whitson,31 deal with the training and physical
capacity of the operator to safely operate the vehicle. In Morrison the
driver had been awake twenty-two hours as of the time of the accident,
had worked a full eight hour day, had done considerable driving that day,
and had fallen alseep at the wheel of the car, thus causing the car to leave
the roadway and crash. The Snider case involved an elderly woman with
reduced vision. The evidence indicated that she was fully aware of her
physical limitations, yet she went ahead and invited the guest for a ride.
In each of these cases, the court held that there was sufficient evidence
to support a finding of "wilful misconduct" under the California auto-
mobile guest statute. These cases strongly suggest that if a pilot invites
guests aboard knowing that he is suffering from physiological infirmities,
then any accidents resulting from those disabilities will not be within the
purview of the aviation guest laws.
An Ohio automobile case suggests another analogy. In Robertson v.
Havens,"' the court held that the allegations in the complaint were suffici-
ent to raise the issue of the driver's "wilful and wanton misconduct" when
they asserted the following facts:
1. that a gasket in the exhaust system of the car was defective and was
leaking combustion by-products, including carbon-monoxide;
2. that this defect was known to the driver;
3. that the driver knew that failure to repair the gasket could result in
carbon monoxide poisoning of the guest;
4. that the driver failed to have the gasket repaired;
5. that that driver invited the guest for a ride anyway; and,
6. that the guest experienced carbon monoxide poisoning.




"9o269 Cal. App. 2d 863, 75 Cal. Rptr. 274 (1969).
310 184 Cal. App. 2d 211, 7 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1960).
.. 1 154 N.E.2d 449 (Ohio App. 1957).
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would render the aircraft unsafe or unairworthy, and who goes ahead and
uses the aircraft to transport a "guest," be guilty of "wilful and wanton
misconduct?"
In regard to the guest statute exceptions based on "gross negligence,"
"heedlessness or reckless disregard of the rights of others," "wilful and
wanton disregard of the rights of others," "wilful and/or wanton mis-
conduct," and "wilful misconduct" there is a very subtle and important
element that plaintiffs must show before they may recover from the host.
That element is the "intent" or "state of mind" of the host and requires
some discussion.
E. "Intent" and "State of Mind" of the Host
As with so many aspects of guest cases, the question of whether a plain-
tiff must plead and prove a particular state of mind of the host so as to
show breach of the appropriate diminished standard of care has been an-
swered in many ways. The various definitions of these diminished standards
of care that were discussed earlier all speak in terms of the host "inten-
tionally" doing an act or acting with "conscious" knowledge of the dangers
involved or of the probability of injury to the guest. Courts in aviation
guest law jurisdictions, in case after case, speak in these terms whenever
they are faced with defining these concepts. '
The problem appears to be: (1) whether plaintiff must show the actual
subjective frame of mind of the host when he committed the casual act,
or (2) whether the plaintiff need only show sufficient external and objective
facts that the host knew or should have known that would warrant a
reasonable man in the circumstances to realize that the causal act involved
a high degree of danger.' Obviously, if the formtr rule prevailed the plain-
tiffs in aviation guest cases would have a very tough time indeed.
To begin, it should be noted that it need not be shown that the host
intended to injure or kill his guest. That is not necessary in any jurisdic-
tion, although New Mexico comes the closest to requiring it."' Some of the
earlier guest cases suggested that the plaintiffs had to prove the actual sub-
jective state of mind of the host."'1 New Mexico," ' North Dakota,"' Ohios"
and South Carolina"' appear to retain this requirement.
But such an approach has been strongly criticized.' The better rule, it
s" Ferrell, supra note 303; Chappell v. Palmer, 236 Cal. App. 2d 34, 45 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1965);
Grant v. Clarke, 78 Idaho 412, 305 P.2d 752 (1956); Rowe v. Frazer, 83 I11. App. 2d 367, 227
N.E.2d 781 (1967); Sausaman v. Leininger, 137 N.E.2d 547 (Ind. App. 1956); Prentkiewicz v.
Karp, 375 Mich. 367, 134 N.W.2d 717 (1965); Smith v. Wilson, 78 N.M. 491, 432 P.2d 847
(1967); Holcomb v. Striebel, - N.D. __, 133 N.W.2d 435 (1965); Mitchell v. Brewer, 193
N.E.2d 304 (Ohio App. 1962); Yaun v. Baldridge, 243 S.C. 414, 134 S.E.2d 248 (1964); Minick
v. Englert, 167 N.W.2d 551 (S.D. 1969); see Comment, 35 MICH. L. REV. 804, 812 (1937).
"' 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 954 (1956); Note, Treadmill to Confusion--Ohio's
Guest Statute, 8 WEST. RES. L. REV. 170, 175, 182 (1957).
14 See Carpenter v. Yates, supra note 287, and accompanying text.
3' See 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 313, for a listing of the cases.
sx' Smith, supra note 312, and Carpenter, supra note 287.
311 Holcomb, supra note 312.
ass Mitchell, supra note 312; Jenkins v. Sharp, 140 Ohio St. 80, 42 N.E.2d 755 (1942); Thomas
v. Foody, 54 Ohio App. 423, 7 N.E.2d 820 (1936).
'9 Yaun, supra note 312.
32°HARPER & JAMES, supra note 313; see also Note, supra note 309.
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is argued, is not to require proof of the host's subjective state of mind, but
to allow proof of facts either known to the host or that should have been
known to him, from which would a reasonable man would realize that
the host's causal acts would likely result in danger to the safety of the
guest. This is the formula set forth in Section 500 of the Restatement of
the Law of Torts, Second. As indicated above, Idaho and Oregon have
adopted that formula. Hence, they would appear to have adhered to the
more modern objective test. Of the remaining aviation guest law juris-
dictions, the following appear to have joined Idaho and Oregon: Cali-
fornia,"' Illinois,2 Indiana,"' Michigan,". and South Dakota."n
One exception found in the aviation guest statutes of seven states is
completely objective and requires no showing of the state of mind of the
host; i.e., intoxication.
F. "Intoxication" or "Under The Influence of Intoxicating Liquor"
Seven states with aviation guest statutes expressly allow a guest to re-
cover from the host where the cause of the aircraft crash is the intoxica-
tion of the host. California, Idaho, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon and
Utah rely upon the term "intoxication," while Nebraska employs the
phrase "under the influence of intoxicating liquor." Although there may
be very subtle semantic differences in the meaning of these provisions, the
courts have equated them for purposes of host-guest accident litigation."
There has been reasonably little disagreement about the definition of
"intoxication." Generally, the question is:
Whether the person involved is so far under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, or has reached such a degree of intoxication that his ability to operate
a car in the manner that an ordinary prundent and cautious person in full
possession of his faculties, using reasonable care, would operate or drive a
similar vehicle under like conditions.t
Although the precise degree of inebriation is relatively unimportant, the
normal faculties, either perception, will or judgment, must be sufficient-
ly impaired as to render the host unable to operate the vehicle with the
same degree of care or caution characteristic of the sober person of ordi-
nary prudence.m Hence, it would appear that a guest could recover from
a host, where the host commits an act of ordinary negligence as a result of
the influence of alcohol. The Supreme Court of North Dakota has so
ruled.'2
As with other diminished standards of care under the various guest laws,
what constitutes intoxication should be defined in terms of the nature of
221 Chappell, supra note 312.
322 Rowe, supra note 312.
12 Sausaman, supra note 312.
" Prentkiewicz, supra note 312.
12 Minick, supra note 312.
2 Smith v. Baker, 14 Cal. App. 2d 10, 57 P.2d 960; Provins v. Bevis, 70 Wash. 2d 131, 422
P.2d 505 (1967).
"mTracy v. Brecht, 3 Cal. App. 2d 10i5, 111-12, 39 P.2d 498, 501 (1934).
... Frame v. Grisewood, 81 Nev. 114, 399 P.2d 450 (1965); O'Neill v. Henke, 167 Neb.
631, 94 N.W.2d 322 (1959); Sahli v. Fuehrer, 127 N.W.2d 900 (N.D. 1964).
... Brostad v. LaRoque, 98 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1959).
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the particular activity. This general principle was recognized in People
v. Lopez: o
... the degree of intoxication forbidden in each instance generally would be
understood in accordance with the logical demands of the situation. This
appears perfectly reasonable, for a man well might be able to comprehend the
nature of his acts in obtaining a marriage license in a condition that should
absolutely disqualify him to operate an airplane or to mix drugs.
Most definitions of "intoxication" "indicate some relationship between
the use of intoxicants and the conduct of the user . . .,"' in the particular
circumstances. Hence, it is suggested that, because of the greater need for
presence of mind, body and judgment in the safe operation of aircraft,
as compared to automobiles, and the greater risks of more grievious injuries
should carelessness occur, the levels of inebriation that would suffice for a
showing of "intoxication" in aviation guest litigation should be substan-
tially lower than those found to be sufficient in automobile guest cases.
However, we may look to automobile guest cases to set the upper limit of
the impermissible level of inebriation. Surely if one is too "intoxicated" to
operate an automobile within the provisions of the auto guest laws, he will
also be too "intoxicated" to operate an aircraft within the meaning of the
aviation guest statutes. On the other hand, auto cases should not set the
lowest level of "intoxication" within the meaning of the aviation guest
laws.
Where a blood alcohol test has been performed on the host, the question
resolves itself into a comparison of numbers. In Taylor v. Rosiak,S a Cali-
fornia court held:
A person with a blood-alcohol content of .16 per cent is under the influence
of intoxicating liquor so as to affect his ability to operate a motor vehicle
in the manner of a reasonably prudent person, and is intoxicated. He is
physically able to perform the various functions required of the driver of a
car and his intoxication may not be apparent to other persons. A person
having a blood-alcohol content of .02 per cent is not . . . under the influence
of intoxicating liquor.
Another approach to what is the upper level of intoxication in guest
cases was suggested by the Nevada Supreme Court in Downing v. Marlia. 3
The court referred to the section of the traffic laws which created a legal
presumption, for purposes of criminal litigation, that the driver was in-
toxicated if his blood alcohol level was .15 per cent.' California reduced
the presumptive level to .10 per cent,' and has defined "percent" to mean
"grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood."' For purposes of host-
330 26 Cal. Rptr. 532 (1962). The opinion of the California District Court of Appeals, from
which the quotation was taken was vacated upon the granting of a hearing by the Supreme Court.
See 59 Cal. 2d 653, 381 P.2d 637 (1963). The truth of the general remark remained untarnished
by the higher court.
33iMcCoid, Intoxication and Its Effect Upon Civil Responsibility, 42 IOWA L. REv. 38, 41
(1956).
3 2 3 6 Cal. App. 2d 68, 45 Cal. Rptr. 759, 762 (1965).
ass 82 Nev. 295, 417 P.2d 150, 151 (1966).
a 4NEv. REV. STAT. § 484.055(1) (c).
" CAL. VEHICLE CODE, § 23126(a) (3), as amended (1969).
336 Id.
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guest litigation these presumptive levels of intoxication can be helpful in
establishing the level beyond which there should be no doubt about the
incapacity of the host. However, they should not be used to establish the
lowest level of intoxication that would suffice under the various guest
statutes to impose liability upon the host. Research has been conducted
to determine at what minimum percentage of blood alcohol saturation a
person's judgment and perception become affected.3 ' It has been suggested
that an airman's judgment may be affected when the level is as low as .05
percent.'
Finally, it should be carefully noted that if the pilot survives the crash,
his blood alcohol level will not remain constant with time. It is his level at
or just prior to the crash that is determinative. In Taylor v. Rosiak," the
Court recognized that physiological variable to be considered:
A blood-alcohol content varies according not only to the amount and
potency of the beverage consumed, but with the rate of consumption, inas-
much as there is a reduction in blood-alcohol content of approximately .015
or .02 per cent per hour. The maximum effect of the consumption of alcoholic
beverage upon the blood-alcohol content is within one-half to three-quarters
of an hour after consumption, if the person does not have food in his
stomach; otherwise, the period is longer.
There appears to have been very little litigation of this issue heretofore in
cases arising from aircraft accidents. Broyles v. Jess"° is the only reported
case involving aviation guest laws where intoxication of the pilot was
demonstrated. He had a blood-alcohol level of. 10 5 per cent. Unfortunately,
the case turned upon the relationship between the pilot and the corpora-
tion that owned tht aircraft, and there was no discussion of whether the
pilot was "intoxicated" within the meaning of the California aviation
guest statute.
The sole remaining execption to aviation guest statutes is where the
accident was "intentional" on the part of the pilot or owner.
G. "Intentional"
Delaware, Idaho, New Mexico, Oregon and South Carolina allow re-
covery by a guest if it is shown that the aircraft accident was "intentional."
Each of those jurisdictions provide recovery upon a showing of a lesser
diminished standard of care. As a practical matter, therefore, a guest
would not be put to the very heavy burden of showing that, in essence,
the pilot or the owner had committed an intentional tort. For that reason,
an extended discussion of what constitutes this exception is not warranted.
This conclusion is supported by the fact that in those jurisdictions the
issue has been virtually not litigated at all."'
"' Mohler, Berner, and Goldbaum, Alcohol Question in Aircraft Accident Investigation, AERO-
SPACE MED. 1228-30 (Nov. 1968); Davis, Alcohol and Military Aviation Fatalities, AEROSPACE
MED., 869-72 (Aug. 1968).
'"Alcohol and Air Accidents, THE AIR LnrE PILOT, 32-33 (Dec. 1969).
3 9 Supra note 332.
340201 Cal. App. 2d 841, 20 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1962).
... Fulghum v. Bleakley, 177 S.C. 286, 181 S.E. 30 (1935) is the only reported case this writer
could locate on the point. There, the court defined "intentional" as causing the wrongful act pur-
posely, willfully or designedly.
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Now that the guest has come forward with the evidence of his status
and the aggravated misconduct of the host, there are affirmative defenses
available to the host in an aviation guest case.'
VI. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
A. Introduction
As in other tort litigation, the defendant has available certain affirma-
tive defenses in aviation guest cases. There appears to be some confusion
over the most accurate terminology to be applied. In part, the problem
was and is caused by the failure of the legislatures to define what affirma-
tive defenses apply in automobile and aviation guest cases. However, there
seems to be some consensus on what type of conduct on the part of the
guest will suffice to bar recovery. Generally, the available affirmative de-
fenses are: (1) contributory negligence, (2) comparative negligence, and
(3) assumption of risk.
B. Contributory Negligence
Arkansas, 3  California,' Illinois, "  Indiana,' "  Nevada,47  North Da-
kota,3  Ohio,' South Carolina,'' and Utah.'. have squarely held that
ordinary contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery by the guest
from a host who has committed the appropriate aggravated misconduct.
However, if the guest committed wrongful acts of the same degree of
culpability as those of the host, such as contributory wilful and wanton
misconduct, then recovery would be denied in those jurisdictions."
Idaho appears to be in harmony with the majority. In Loomis v.
Cburch? the court held:
. . . ordinary contributory negligence is not a defense in an action based
upon reckless disregard of the rights of others under our guest statute.
342 See Hardman, Aviation Guest Statutes, INS. L.J. 561, 564, 567 (1962).
"
43 Roberts v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 138 F. Supp. 363, 375 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
'"Williams v. Carr, 68 Cal. 2d 920, 440 P.2d 505, 511 (1968).
3
'Lessen v. Allison, 25 111. App. 2d 395, 166 N.E.2d 806, 809-10 (1960); Robinson v. Work-
man, 15 Ill. App. 2d 25, 145 N.E.2d 265 (1957); Schultz v. Stephan, 8 Ill. App. 2d 563, 132
N.E.2d 30 (1956); Valentine v. England, 6 Ill. App. 2d 275, 127 N.E.2d 473, 474-75 (1955);
see also Comment, The Illinois Guest Statute: An Analysis and Reappraisal, 54 Nw. U. L. Ruv. 263,
267, n.19 (1959); Huff, Basis of Liability in Automobile Cases, 1953 ILL. L. FORUM 28, 40.
346 Pierce v. Clemens, 113 Ind. App. 65, 46 N.E.2d 836, 840 (1942); Hoeppner v. Saltzgaber,
102 Ind. App. 458, 200 N.E. 458, 464 (1936); Coconover v. Stoddard, - Ind. App. __, 182
N.E. 466 (1932); see also Harper, Development in the Law of Torts in Indiana, 21 INn. L.J. 447,
451 (1946); Lowe, Suggestions for the Trial of Auto Damage Suits, 16 IND. L.J. 286, 293 (1940);
Appleman, Wilful and Wanton Conduct in Automobile Guest Cases, 13 IND. L.J. 131, 145
(1937-38); Note, 34 IND. L.J. 338, 349 (1958).
"f Downing v. Marlia, 82 Nev. 294, 417 P.2d 150, 153 (1966); Ormand v. Brehm, 82 Nev.
143, 413 P.2d 493, 495 (1966).
'
" Ledford v. Klein, 87 N.W.2d 345, 352 (N.D. 1957).
.
4 Melville v. Greyhound Corp., 94 Ohio App. 258, 115 N.E.2d 42, 45-46 (1953); Gill v.
Arthur, 69 Ohio App. 386, 43 N.E.2d 895, 898 (1941); Haacke v. Lease, 41 N.E.2d 590, 596
(Ohio App. 1941).
' Hiott v. Bishop, 244 S.C. 524, 137 S.E.2d 780, 783 (1964); Lynch v. Alexander, 242 S.C.
208, 130 S.E.2d 563, 565 (1963).
"' Roylance v. Davies, 18 Utah 2d 395, 424 P.2d 142, 146 (1967).
3s Williams, supra note 344; Vallentine, supra note 345; Pierce, supra note 346; Ormand,
supra note 347; Lynch, supra note 350; see also Weber, Guest Statutes, 11 U. L. REv. 24, 57
(1937).
85376 Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561, 564 (1954).
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Loomis was reaffirmed in Smith v. Sharp. " However, in Hayslip v.
George,"a the same court stated that:
. . . as a general rule a guest passenger must pay such attention to his own
welfare as a reasonably prudent person would under like circumstances.
The apparent conflict is somewhat ameliorated when the language is put
in the factual context. The defense's theory was that the guest failed to
protest and take action to evacuate the vehicle upon becoming aware of
the danger created by the misconduct of the driver. As we shall see below,
this defense is very much like the defense of assumption of a known risk,
in that it does not involve affirmative acts of misconduct by the guest
which contribute to the cause of the accident.
Opinions in Georgia, " Nebraska,"? New Mexico,' and Oregon35 refer
to the terminology of "contributory negligence," but also appear to be
talking about assumption of risk. For example, the Georgia court, in deal-
ing with a situation where the guests accepted a ride in the host's aircraft
knowing of dangerous flying conditions, used the term "negligence" in
regard. to the guest's conduct. Similarly the courts in Nebraska, New
Mexico and Oregon were faced with a record that indicated that the host
was physically incapacitated for one reason or another, yet the guests
either accepted a ride or continued to ride with the host. The misconduct
of the guest in each case was voluntarily placing himself in a place of
known or clearly knowable danger, and not committing acts that con-
tributed to the cause in fact of the crash. Be that as it may, the Oregon
court goes so far as to expressly reject the "assumption of risk" designation
for such acts by the guests and refers to them as "contributory negligence."
Whatever tht label that is used, the bulk of the cases deal with either
accepting a ride with a host who is known to be incapable of safely operat-
ing the vehicle or remaining in the vehicle after such incapacity is mani-
fested by the host's conduct and the guest's failure to protest and/or
remove himself from the vehicle.
As to what will suffice to show that the guest committed acts of mis-
conduct equal in their culpability to those of the host, we must again
refrain from generalization. Each case is sui generis and only broad out-
lines can be suggested. Where the guest participates in the previous activi-
ties of the host, such as a drinking party that renders the host incapable of
safely operating the vehicle, the guest has been held guilty of contributory
wilful misconduct.' Apparently the acts of the guest contributed to the
cause of the crash in that they contributed to the incapacity of the host.
3485 Idaho 17, 375 P.2d 184, 194 (1962).
35592 Idaho 349, 442 P.2d 759, 763 (1968).
... Huguley, supra note 271.
" Kaufman v. Tripple, 180 Neb. 593, 144 N.W.2d 201, 206 (1966).
"
38 Perini v. Perini, 64 N.M. 79, 324 P.2d 779, 780 (1958).
59 Zunwalt v. Lindland, 239 Ore. 26, 396 P.2d 205, 207 (1964).
36 Godinez v. Soares, 216 Cal. App. 2d 145, 30 Cal. Rptr. .767 (1963); Smith v. Maloney, 26
Cal. App. 2d 97, - P.2d - (1938); Schneider v. Brecht, 6 Cal. App. 2d 379, - P.2d
(1935).
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Conceptually these cases seem to be very near the theory of assumption
of a known risk.
One aviation guest law state, South Dakota, expressly provides in its
statute that "no person so transported shall have such a cause of action if
he has . . .by want of ordinary care brought the injury upon himself."
Thus, South Dakota clearly bars recovery to the guest upon a showing of
ordinary contributory negligence even though the host was guilty of
t"willful and wanton misconduct."
C. Assumption Of Risk
There appears to be no dissent among the aviation guest law jurisdic-
tions from the rule that if a guest has knowledge of dangers or risks to be
encountered in riding with the host and yet either accepts or continues the
ride voluntarily, without protest, he will be barred from recovery no
matter how culpable the host may be. Many courts label this defense
"assumption of risk." '' The elements of this defense are:...
1. The guest had a knowledge and appreciation of the dangers and risks;
2. The guest had a reasonable opportunity to make an alternative choice;
and,
3. The guest voluntarily placed himself in a position of danger.
Where the danger or risk does not become known until after the ride
begins, however, the host must go one step further in his proof of assump-
tion of risk. The rule was well stated in Lynch v. Alexander:
The test ... is not whether a guest knowing that the driver's conduct is
improper, has a reasonable opportunity to leave the automobile, but whether
a reasonable opportunity being afforded, a person in the exercise of ordinary
care would have done so under the circumstances.
Finally, the host has the burden of showing that the specific risk assumed
was the one that caused the accident. 4
Neither time nor space are presently available to discuss specific factual
situations that have supported the doctrine of "assumption of risk" in
aviation accident litigation in general. 5 There appears to be no reason why
those rules should not be applicable in aviation guest cases.
There is one additional doctrine in some aviation guest law states that
wears the cloak of an affirmative defense, but tends to be more of a means
' 'Roberts v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 138 F. Supp. 363, 375 (W.D. Ark. 1956); Scott
v. Shairrick, 225 Ark. 59, 279 S.W.2d 39, 42 (1952); Cooke v. Stevens, 191 Cal. App. 2d 457,
12 Cal. Rptr. 828, 829 (1961); Ward v. Knapp, 134 Cal. App. 2d 538, 286 P.2d 370, 372 (1955);
Ridgway v. Yenney, 223 Ind. 16, 57 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1944); Pierce, supra note 346; O'Brien
v. Anderson, 177 Neb. 635, 130 N.W.2d 560, 567 (1964); Downing, supra note 347; Gill, supra
note 349; Benton v. Davis, 248 S.C. 402, 150 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1966); Jacques v. Farrimond, 14
Utah 2d 166, 380 P.2d 133, 134 (1963); see also Pedrick, Taken For a Ride: The Automobile Guest
and Assumption of Risk, 22 LA. L. REv. 90, 93-94 (1961); for a good discussion of the historical
background and development of the doctrine of assumption of risk, see Rice, The Automobile
Guest and the Rationale of Assumption of Risk, 27 MINN. L. REV. 323, 324-34 (1943).
s"a O'Brien and Jacques, supra note 361.
36 Supra note 350, at S.E.2d 566; see also Singleton v. Hughes, 245 S.C. 169, 139 S.E.2d 747
(1965); Jackson v. Jackson, 234 S.C. 291, 108 S.E.2d 86 (1959).
.04 In Re Kinsey's Estate, 152 Neb. 95, 40 N.W.2d 526, 534 (1949).
saSee 8 AM. JusR. 2d, AVIATION, § 87, at 713-14 (1963).
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of apportioning damages according to relative fault; i.e. comparative negli-
gence.
D. Comparative Negligence
Four aviation guest law jurisdictions have adopted, either by statute or
by case law, the doctrine of comparative negligence. Arkansas,"' Ne-
braska," ' and South Dakota"' have done so by statute, while Georgia" '
has done so by judicial decisions.
All three comparative negligence statutes expressly limit their applica-
tion to actions based on "negligence." The question thus arises: Do these
statutes apply to aviation host-guest litigation? In Nebraska the answer
is clearly in the affirmative." ' However, it should be noted that the excep-
tion provided in the Nebraska automobile and aviation guest statutes is
based on the gross negligence of the host. And since Georgia also predicates
recovery by a guest upon gross negligence, it would seem that the rule in
Nebraska should apply.
The question becomes more difficult when recovery by the guest is based
upon the wilful or wanton misconduct of the host. Such is the situation
in Arkansas and South Dakota. The latter jurisdiction has resolved the issue
by expressly providing in its automobile. 1 and aviation guest statutes that
the guest shall not recover if he brought the injury upon himself "by want
of ordinary care."
The Arkansas statutes do not have a similar provision. Therefore, since
a guest must show that the host wilfully and wantonly operated the air-
craft in disregard of the rights of others, and since that standard is not
a form of "negligence" as continued in the statute, it could be strongly
argued that the prorata damage apportionment authorized by the com-
parative negligence statutes would not apply to aviation guest cases. The
issue does not appear to have been determined by an appellate court."'
Although it has been held that ordinary contributory negligence is not
a bar to recovery from the host for his wilful and wanton disregard for
the rights of the guest,7 3 that would not authorize pro rata reduction of
damages based on the ratio of aggravated fault between the guest and host.
Such a strict and literal construction of the Arkansas comparative negli-
gence statute would defeat the obvious Legislative intention to apportion
damages along the lines of fault allocation.
No discussion of the impact of guest laws upon aviation accident litiga-
865ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1730.1, 27-1730.2 (1947).
uNEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 '(1943).
38 S.D. CoMP. LAWS § 20-9-1 (1967).
... Whatley v. Henry, 65 Ga. App. 668, 16 S.E.2d 214, 220 (1941); Lewis v. Powell, 51 Ga.
App. 129, 179 S.E. 865, 867-68 (1935).
.7. Hess v. Holdsworth, 176 Neb. 774, 127 N.W.2d 487, 493-94 (1964); Landrum v. Roddy,
12 N.W.2d 82, 88 (Neb. 1943); see also 149 A.L.R. 1050 (1944); Gradwohl, Comparative Negli-
gence of an Automobile Guest-Apportionment of Damages Under the Comparative Negligence
Statute, 33 NEB. L. REv. 54 (1953).
37 S.D. CoMp. LAWS § 32-34-2 (1967).
"' The general relationship between these two statutes is discussed in Leflar, Comparative Negli-
gence-A Survey For Arkansas Lawyers, 10 ARK. L. REv. 54, 61-62 (1955-56). This particular
point was not raised.
37sSupra note 343.
1970]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
tion would be complete without consideration of the wisdom of such
rules of law.
VII. REPEAL
The history of aviation guest law must be examined together with the
emergence of identical doctrines in automobile accident litigation. It is
obvious that sixteen Legislatures in automobile guest statute jurisdictions
could not resist the sweet smell of symmetry. They rushed in and en-
grafted on aviation accident litigation their automobile guest laws. Clearly
they were assisted in this decision by the liability insurance lobbies in the
various states. 74 These "legislative advocates" were well financed and orga-
nized and obtained their objective without opposition from any group
representing the wrongfully injured or killed."' Consequently, there was
very little deliberate thought given to the wisdom and impact of such
statutes; nor was there much analysis of the alleged socio-economic reasons
for these statutes. The liability insurance lobbyist pointed the finger of
moral blame at the ever growing class of "hitchhikers" during the Great
Depression and contended that these unworthy vagabonds should not be
allowed to bite the hand of the friendly host who stopped to give them a
life and then ran them into a tree. Dean Prosser has observed:
In legislative hearings there is frequent mention of the hitch-hiker, who gets
little sympathy. The writer once found a hitch-hiker case, but has mislaid it.
He has been unable to find another."7 6
Such was the beginning of the rationale for the first purpose to be served
by guest statutes; i.e. one should not be allowed to sue someone who gives
him a free ride even though injury or death resulted from the benefactor's
carelessness.
The logic and persuasiveness of this argument clearly fails when the
real party in interest is the liability insurer of the host.7 The insurer has
conferred no gratuity. To the contrary, it has exacted from the host a
money payment to protect him from liability.
Without regard to the presence of an insurer, the lack of soundness of
this sophistry was exposed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Cohen
v. Kaminetsky :37
It sometimes is suggested that the recipient of a favor should be more grate-
ful. The short answer is that the favor is hardly worth the price exacted
from the injured in thus absolving the wrongdoer.
"'Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205, 210 (1966); A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 579 (1962); W. PROSSER, TORTS 190-91 (3d ed., 1964); Lascher, Hard Laws Make Bad
Cases-Lots of Them (The California Guest Statute), 9 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 1, 10 (1968);
Pedrick, Taken For a Ride: The Automobile Guest and Assumption of Risk, 22 LA. L. REv. 90,
91 (1961); Tipton, Florida's Automobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FLA. L. Rav. 287 (1958).
$75 Lascher, supra note 374, at 92.
376 PROSSER, supra note 374, at 191, n.83.
37 Ehrenzweig, supra note 374, at 577; Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress?
Reflections on Reading Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 46 TEx. L. REv. 141, 173 (1967);
Note, The Ohio Guest Statute, 10 U. CIN. L. REv. 289, 303-04 (1936).
378 36 N.J. 276, 176 A.2d 483, 487 (1961).
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When one considers the horrendous injuries and frequent death that
result from the typical crash of an aircraft, it becomes ludicrous to say
that the pilot should be protected from his carelessness because, after all,
the ride was free. Once again Dean Prosser has put his finger on the truth:
Essentially, however, the theory of the acts is that one who receives a gratui-
tous favor in the form of a free ride has no right to demand that his host
shall exercise ordinary care not to injure him. The typical guest case is that
of the driver who offers his friend a lift to the office or invites him out to
dinner, negligently drives him into a collision, and fractures his skull-after
which the driver and his insurance company take refuge in the statute, step
out of the picture, and leave the guest to bear his own loss. If this is good
social policy, it at least appears under a novel front.'m
The second reason advanced for the wisdom of guest statutes is that
hosts and guests are often family members or close friends and conspire
to defraud insurance companies." Although there was much discussion
about such collusive suits and how they were clogging the courts with
useless lawsuits, the liability insurance industry apparently never has tabu-
lated the actual number of such suits. If such empirical data exists, it has
been retained by the insurers. One gets the definite impression that such
conspiracies were more of a myth than a reality.
This second rationale has been repeatedly discredited by the courts and
legal writers. 1 It assumes that most guests and hosts are evil-doing frauds
just waiting to conspire. This runs counter to the phychological phenomena
that most people in our society are an honest and fair minded lot. Indeed
our whole jurisprudential and commercial fabric is built on that assump-
tion.
Hence, just and meritorious claims are rejected simply "to protect in-
surance companies from fraud and collusion..' "The interest of the public
is to be balanced against that of the insurance companies. . . . The inter-
ests of many should not be penalized to protect against the alleged evil
design of a few."'
It has not been explained how these statutes in fact prevent collusive
claims by those who are determined to defraud an insurance company.'
The courts have not taken kindly to the implied indictment of the ability
of the judicial process to discover the truth:
Nor are we impressed with the further thought that the prospect of collusion
should lead to a different standard of care. We see no inevitable connection
between the subjects. It is the regular business of the courts to find the
truth.,
8 7 9
PROSSER, supra note 374, at 191.
380 Id. note 29.
... Klein v.'Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 696, 376 P.2d 70 (1962); Cohen, supra note 378; Ehren-
zweig, supra note 374, at 578; Lasher, supra note 374, at 20; Hardman, supra note 342, at 562;
Comment, The Case Against the Guest Statute, 7 WM. & MARY L. REv. 321, 328 (1966); Com-
ment, The Illinois Guest Statute: An Analysis and Reappraisal, 54 Nw. U. L. REV. 263, 273 (1959);
Note, 1 Wyo. L.J. 182, 186 (1947); Note, supra note 377, at 306-07.
.83 Note, 1 Wyo. L.J. 182, 186 (1947).
383 Id.
'N Cohen, supra note 378, at A.2d 487; Lascher, supra note 374; Hardman, supra note 342, at
562.
" Cohen, supra note 381.
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It would be a sad commentary on the law if we were to admit that the judicial
processes are so ineffective that we must deny relief to a person otherwise
entitled simply because in some future case a litigant may be guilty of fraud
or collusion. Once that concept were accepted, then all causes of action should
be abolished. Our legal system is not that ineffectual.8 ' (Emphasis added.)
Further, if both host and guest are not to be stopped by concerns of con-
science, then why could they not fabricate "payment" or "compensation"
under these statutes with as equal ease as they allegedly made up "simple
negligence" under the common law?
Surely liability insurance companies, their investigators and trial attor-
neys are capable of taking care of themselves. They are at the scene of the
accident at a very early time. They have the facts long before any lay host
or guest could possibly know what facts to manufacture to establish negli-
gence, assuming the conspiracy emerges after the accident. The thought of
two people in an aircraft conceiving such a plot before the event is simply
absurd.
Hence, before such a fraud can be effective, the scheme must withstand
the investigation of the insurer's accident investigators, the cross exami-
nation of attorneys for the insurer, the trial process and the appellate
courts. That is too great a burden for laymen. Yet on the basis of this
myth, many innocent and grievously injured guests must go uncompen-
sated.
One final argument is made in support of guest statutes, automobile
and aviation; i.e. they reduce liability insurance premiums. This argument
raises the whole subject of the validity of such rules of law in our modern
socio-economic circumstances, for clearly our jurisprudence must make
social and economic sense to the people." First, do guest statutes, either
automobile or aviation, reduce insurance premiums? Various writers have
compared the liability insurance rates in guest-statute and no-guest-statute
jurisdictions.' The rates are not directly related to the existence of guest
statutes:
One can only conclude that liability insurance rates, which not only may
vary widely from one state to another having similar laws but also in various
territories within individual states, are determined primarily if not entirely
by factors other than the presence or absence of guest statutes."
Another writer concluded that the argument has but limited validity:"'
. . . rates in New York, which has no guest statute or common-law guest
rule, are lower than the rates in Massachusetts, which does. The state with
the lowest rates in New England is Maine; it has no restrictions on guests.
The average annual automobile-liability policy costs in the twenty-one no-
guest-rule states is $67.75 and in the twenty-nine guest-rule states $58.03.
"' Klein, supra note 381.
8
87 Allen, Why Do Courts Coddle Insurance Companies?, 61 AMER. L. REV. 77, 88 (1927).
380 Joost, The Automobile Guest Rule: Sound Public Policy or Legal Dinosaur?, 2 PORTrA L.J.
105, 115-16 (1966); Tipton, Florida's Automobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 287, 305
(1958); Comment, supra note 381, at 7 WM. & MARY L. REV. 327-28.
319Tipton, supra note 388, at 306.
'
90 Joost, supra note 388, at 112-13.
[Vol. 3 6
AVIATION GUEST LAWS
These figures would indicate that at the very worst, rates would be in-
creased by less than $10.00 per year! What a small price to take care of
a friend-who would not pay it?
The argument that if insurance premiums are to go up, then let us
keep laws that deprive innocent victims of wrongdoing from recovery is
morally barbaric. For a soft piece of gold or silver in our pocket, we will
wrongfully maim or kill our family and friends without compensating
them so they can rebuild their lives. The moral fiber of the American people
is capable of a more humane rule.
There is no reason to believe the situation is any different in aviation.
An aircraft can cross state boundaries with impunity. On any given flight,
it may fly over guest-law states. Thus, rates must be set with the very real
probability in mind that the guest law of the state where the aircraft is
based will not apply. This is particularly true when one remembers that
only seventeen states in the United States have aviation guest laws.
If we assume that insurance premiums will increase if aviation guest
laws are repealed, the question is whether or not that would be a better
order for society. Since it is safe to assume that human losses from care-
lessness in the operation of aircraft will not be eradicated, the question
becomes: Is it better to distribute these losses broadly among the class of
owners and users of aircraft or should they be borne solely by the innocent
victims or their heirs? The better answer is:
If experience shows that insurance rates are higher in states where a statute
does not limit the common law liability, it does not follow that such in-
creased rates should be a deciding factor in determining the duty a driver
owes to his guest. From a sociological view-point, it may be that the public
good would be better served by having the loss to the injured passenger
shared by the automobile-owing public rather than borne by the injured
person alone.59'
No one can question the proposition that the liability insurance industry
is in a much better financial position to withstand these losses than is the
class of victims."9 Such a system is consistent with modern concepts:
It is the principle job of tort law today to deal with these losses. The best
and most efficient way to do this is to assure accident victims of compensa-
tion, and to distribute the losses involved over society as a whole or some
very large segment of it.
Of prime importance is the fact that wherever there is widely held insurance,
tort liability no longer merely shifts a loss from one individual to another but
it tends to distribute the loss according to the principles of insurance, and the
person nominally liable is often only a conduit through whom this process
of distribution starts to flow."'3
3" Mundt, The South Dakota Automobile Guest Statute, 2 S.D. L. REv. 70, 75 (1957); see also
Pedrick, supra note 370, at 103-04; Gregory, Gratuitous Undertakings and the Duty of Care, 1
DE PAU5L L. REv. 30 (1951); Comment, The Liability of an Automobile Driver to a Non-Paying
Passenger, 20 VA. L. Ruv. 326, 333 (1933).
"'James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J.
549 (1947).
S Id. at 550-51. See also Leflar, Conflicts Law: More On Choice-Influencing Considerations,
54 CAL. L. REv. 1584, 1595 (1966).
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Virtually every writer agrees that guest statutes are a hangover from an
earlier set of socio-economic conditions that no longer prevail.' " The con-
ditions have changed and so must the law if we are to improve our juris-
prudence and the society it is supposed to serve. These statutes have had
a deplorable impact upon the administration of justice. Again we can
turn to Dean Prosser:
There is perhaps no other group of statutes which have filled the courts
with appeals on so many knotty little problems involving petty and other-
wise entirely inconsequential points of law."
Appellate Court opinions dealing with issues peculiar to guest cases in
jurisdictions with aviation guest laws would fill many many volumes. In
California, for example, prior to 1968 there were 201 appeals where one of
the guest statutes played a pivotal role."' o The problem doesn't stop there:
According to the latest report of the California Judicial Council, the average
number of civil dispositions per California appellate justice is approximately
43 per year. In other words, the state has expended five judge-years on work-
ing out the knotty, inconsequential little problems attendant upon stamping
out ingratitude and burning down the barn to prevent collusion. This is not
only a human and intellectual extravagance but also a considerable economic
waste. If the ratio of approximately 125 civil dispositions by the superior
court to every appellate civil disposition holds true in the area of Guest Act
litigation, it may be assumed that the superior courts have been required to
dispose of some 25,000 Guest Act cases to date. "7
This expenditure of time, effort and money by our legal system would be
endurable if it were for some high purpose. But, when one realizes that it
is caused by laws that were lobbied through state Legislatures by a very
powerful economic interest group for the purpose of depriving innocent
victims of fair and adequate compensation for their wrongfully inflicted
injuries, one cannot help being disguested. Further, guest laws cripple
the process of settlement outside the courtroom. The insurer knows that
he stands a better chance of not having to pay for wrongfully inflicted
injuries if he forces every case into the trial and appellate courts.
Finally, these statutes have lead to confusing definitions and subtleties. " '
There is no certainty of what the law happens to be in any given case.
They have reintroduced the concept of varying degrees of negligence,
which has been thoroughly repudiated.'" In a dissent a member of the
Oregon Supreme Court stated the existing situation in very frank terms:
..4 Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579, 586-87 (1968); Heath v. Zellmer,
35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664, 676 (1967); CAvERs, THE CHoICE OF LAW PRocEss 297-98
(1965); Lasher, supra note 374, at 10.
39 PROSSER, supra at 374.
s Lasher, supra note 374, at 24.
897 id.
'0 Stevens v. Stevens, 355 Mich. 363, 94 N.W.2d 858, 861 (1959); Turner v. McCready, 190
Ore. 28, 222 P.2d 1010, 1018 (1950); Appleman, Guest Cases in Aviation Law, 9 AIR L. REV.
30 (1938); Corish, The Automobile Guest, 14 Bos. U. L. REV. 728, 729 (1934); Note, 42 VA.
L. REV. 97, 101 (1956).
S99Mayer v. Puryear, 115 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir. 1940); Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6
S. CAL. L. REV. 91, 134-35 (1933); Note, 34 U. DET. L.J. 169, 170 (1956); Note, 33 ORE. L.
REv. 216, 218 (1954); Note, 10 U. CiN. L. REV. 289, 290 (1936).
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The basic issue that I come to is: If the guest act has become, as it appears
to be, unworkable and incapable of sensible application, we should say so.
We should not wait for a harried legislature to relieve the courts of the
state of an intolerable burden that results in more injustice than justice.""
We have come the full circle:
Polonius: "What do you read, my lord?"
Hamlet: "'Words, words, words."
APPENDIX
ARKANSAS
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-913 (1947)
"No person transported as a guest in any automotive vehicle upon the
public highways or in aircraft being flown in the air, or while upon the
ground shall have a cause of action against the owner or operator of such
vehicle, or aircraft, for damage on account of any injury, death or loss
occasioned by the operation of such automotive vehicle or aircraft unless
such vehicle or aircraft was wilfully and wantonly operated in disregard
of the rights of the others."
The term guest as used in this act shall mean self-invited guest or guest
at sufferance.
CALIFORNIA
CAL. VEH. CODE § 17158 (West 1966).
"A guest riding in or upon any aircraft without giving compensation, or
any other person, does not have any right of action for civil damages
against the airman flying the aircraft or against any other person other-
wise legally liable for the conduct of the airman, on account of personal
injury to, or the death of, the guest during such ride, unless the plaintiff
in the action establishes that the injury or death proximately resulted from
the intoxication or wilful misconduct of the airman."
DELAWARE
DELAWARE CODE ANN. § 1601 (1953).
(a) "No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle,
boat, airplane or other vehicle as his guest without payment for such
transportation shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner
or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such acci-
dent was intentional on the part of such owner or operator or was caused
by his wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of others."
(b) "The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not relieve a
public carrier, or any owner or operator of a motor vehicle while the
vehicle is being demonstrated or a prospective purchaser, of responsibility
for any injuries sustained by a passenger being transported by such public
carrier or by such owner or operator."
4
°"Burghardt v. Olson, 223 Ore. 155, 354 P.2d 871, 881 (1960).
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GEORGIA
In Sammons v. Webb, 86 Ga. App. 382, 71 S.E.2d 832 (1952), Georgia
has applied to aircraft accidents the minority Massachusetts rule which re-
quires a guest to show gross negligence.
IDAHO
IDAHO CODE § 21-212 (1949):
"No person transported by the owner or operator of any aircraft as his
guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action
for damages against such owner or operator for injuries, death or loss, in
case of accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on the
part of the said owner or operator or caused by his intoxication or gross
negligence."
ILLINOIS
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 15 1/2, § 22.83 (1961):
"No person riding in an aircraft as a guest, without payment for the ride,
nor his personal representative in the event of the death of such guest,
shall have a cause of action against any airman of such aircraft or its
owner or his employee or agent for injury, death or loss, in case of acci-
dent, unless the accident was caused by the wilful and wanton misconduct
of the airman of such aircraft or its owner or his employee or agent and
unless such wilful and wanton misconduct contributed to the injury,
death or loss from which the action is brought."
INDIANA
IND. STAT. § 14-924 (1964):
"The owner, operator or person responsible for the operation of an air-
craft shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or
death of a guest, while being transported without payment therefore, in
such aircraft, resulting from the operation thereof, unless such injuries or
death are caused by the wanton or wilful misconduct of such operator,
owner, or person responsible for the operation of such aircraft."
MASSACHUSETTS
In Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917), the
Supreme Judicial Court held that an automobile guest must show gross
negligence before recovering money damages. It appears that Massachusetts
has not squarely decided whether this shall be the rule in aviation acci-
dents. In Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc. 278 Mass. 420, 180 N.E.
212 (1932), the court stated in dicta that the rules of law involving torts
on land would be applicable to torts in the air. In Walthew v. Davis 201
Va. 557, 561, 562, 111 S.E.2d 784 (1960), however, the court stated that
in its opinion Massachusetts would not apply the Massaletti rule to aviation.
MICHIGAN
MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 259.180(a) (1967):
"No person transported by the owner or operator or the person responsible
for the maintenance or use of any aircraft as a guest without payment
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for such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages against tht
owner or operator or person responsible for the maintenance or use of the
aircraft for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless the accident
shall have been caused by the gross negligence or wilful and wanton mis-
conduct of the owner or operator or the person responsible for the main-
tenance or use of the aircraft, and unless the gross negligence or wilful
and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator or the person responsible
for the maintenance or use of the aircaft contrributed to the injury,
death or loss for which the action is brought."
(2) " 'Guest' means any person other than an employee of the owner or
registrant of the aircraft, or of a person responsible for its operation with
the owner's or registrant's express or implied consent, being in or upon,
entering or leaving the same, except any passenger for hire and except
any passenger while the aircraft is being used in the business of demonstrat-
ing or testing. The sharing of expense shall not constitute a carriage for
hire within the meaning of this act."
(3) " 'Person or organization responsible for the maintenance or use of
an aircraft' shall not include a mechanic who has performed work on or
furnished materials, supplies or equipment for an aircraft or any employee
of the mechanic when the mechanic is an independent contractor."
NEBRASKA
NEB. REV. STAT. § 3-129.01 (1967):
"The owner or operator of any aircraft shall not be liable for any dam-
ages to any passenger or person riding in such aircraft as a guest or by
invitation and not for hire, unless such damage is caused by the pilot of
such aircraft being under the influence of intoxicating liquor or because
of the gross negligence of the owner or operator in the operation of such
aircraft. For the purpose of this section, the term guest is hereby defined
as being a person who accepts a ride in any aircraft without giving com-
pensation therefore, but shall not be construed to apply to or include any
such passenger in any aircraft being demonstrated to such passenger as a
prospective purchaser."
NEVADA
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.190 (1967):
"No person riding in an aircraft as a guest within or above the State
of Nevada, without payment for the ride or transportation, nor his per-
sonal representative, in the event of the death of such guest, shall have a
cause of action against any pilot or crewman or such aircraft, or its owner
or his employee or agent, for injury, death or loss sustained while so riding
as a guest unless the proximate cause of the injury, death or loss was the
intoxication, willful misconduct or gross negligence of the pilot, crewman,
owner or employee or agent of the owner."
NEW MEXICO
N.M. STAT. § 44-1-16 (1953):
"No person riding in an aircraft as a guest, without payment for the ride
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or transportation, nor his personal representative in the event of the death
of such guest, shall have a cause of action against any pilot or crewman
of such aircraft or its owners or his employee or agent for injury, death,
or loss which occurs as a result of an accident unless such accident shall
have been intentional on the part of said owner or operator or caused by
his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others."
NORTH DAKOTA
N.D. CENT. CODE § 2-03-14 (1959):
"No person transported by the owner or operator of any aircraft as a
guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of
action for damages against the owner or operator for injury, death or loss
in case of accident, unless the accident shall have been caused by the gross
negligence, intoxication or willful and wanton misconduct of the owner
or operator of the aircraft, and unless the gross negligence, intoxication
or willful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of the aircraft
contributed to the injury, death or loss for which the action is brought.
For purposes of this section, the word "guest" means any person other
than an employee of the owner or registrant of any aircraft, or of a per-
son responsible for its operation with the owner's or registrant's express or
implied consent, being in or upon, entering or leaving the same, except
any passenger for hire and except any passenger while the aircraft is being
used in the business of demonstrating or testing. The sharing of expense
shall not constitute a carriage for hire within the meaning of this section."
OHIO
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4561.151 (page: 1953):
"The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of an air-
craft shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death
of a guest, resulting from the operation of said aircraft, while such guest is
being transported without payment therefor in or upon said aircraft, unless
such injuries or death are caused by the willful or wanton misconduct of
such owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of said air-
craft."
OREGON
ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.115 (1953):
"No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, an
aircraft, a watercraft, or other means of conveyance, as his guest without
payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of action for damages
against the owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident,
unless the accident was intentional on the part of the owner or operator
or caused by his gross negligence or intoxication. As used in this section:
(1) 'Payment' means a substantial benefit in a material or business sense
conferred upon the owner or operator of the conveyance and which is a
substantial motivating factor for the transportation, and it does not in-
clude a mere gratuity or social amenity.
(2) 'Gross negligence' refers to negligence which is materially greater
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than the mere absence of reasonable care under the circumstances, and
which is characterized by conscious indifference to or reckless disregard
of the rights of others."
ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.130 (1953):
"ORS 30.115 shall not relieve a public carrier by aircraft, or any owner
or operator of aircraft while the same is being demonstrated to a prospec-
tive purchaser, of responsibility for any injuries sustained by a passenger."
SOUTH CAROLINA
S.C. CODE § 2-21 (1962):
"No person transported by the owner or operator of an aircraft as his
guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action
for damages against such aircraft, its owner or operator for injury, death
or loss in case of accident unless such accident shall have been intentional
on the part of such owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his
reckless disregard of the rights of others."
S.C. CODE § 2-22 (1962):
"Section 2-21 shall not relieve a public carrier of responsibility for any
injuries sustained by a passenger being transported by such public carrier."
SOUTH DAKOTA
S.D. COMP. CODE, § 50-13-15 (1967):
"No person transported by the owner or operator of any aircraft as his
guest without compensation for such transportation shall have cause of
action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death, or
loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the
willful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of such aircraft,
and unless such willful and wanton misconduct contributed to the injury,
death, or loss for which the action is brought; no person so transported
shall have such cause of action if he has willfully or by want of ordinary
care brought the injury upon himself."
UTAH
UTAH CODE ANN. § 2-1-33 (1953):
"No person riding in an aircraft as a guest, without payment for the ride
or transportation, nor his personal representative in the event of the death
of such guest, shall have a cause of action against any pilot or crewman
of such aircraft or its owner or his employee or agent for injury, death,
or loss, in case of accident, unless the accident was caused by the intoxi-
cation or willful misconduct of the pilot or crewman of such aircraft or
its owners or his employee or agent and unless such intoxication proxi-
mately resulted in the injury, death or loss for which the action is
brought."
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